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Summary 
While the study of cognitive skills within the physical and social domains in primates is well 
established, much less is known about these abilities in birds. Recent studies on corvids and 
parrots discovered that they possess similar cognitive skills as primates. Based on this, it was 
the aim of my dissertation to contribute to a better understanding of the cognitive abilities of 
corvids and parrots. 
Within the physical domain studies of animal cognition have focused on exclusion 
abilities. I tested carrion crows (Corvus corone corone) in a choice by exclusion experiment, 
in which a reward was hidden underneath one of two cups and the birds were only provided 
with visual information about the empty cup. One individual was able to choose correctly, 
while others showed local enhancement effects for the lifted but empty cup. A follow-up 
experiment controlling for the movement of the cups enabled more birds to exclude the wrong 
possibility.  
Based on these findings I tested carrion crows, African grey parrots (Psittacus 
erithacus), and jackdaws (Corvus monedula) in a modified version of the cup lifting 
experiment, in which two rewards were used and always the full information about the food 
location was provided to the birds. All three species showed a strong local enhancement effect 
by preferring the only or last manipulated cup, irrespective of whether it was baited or not. 
Additionally, I tested African grey parrots in an inference by exclusion task, in which 
the correct cup could only be inferred but not chosen by excluding an empty one. One 
individual was able to infer the food underneath the correct cup and is therefore the first bird 
in which this ability has been demonstrated. 
Finally, I tested jackdaws in a transitive inference task on a computer touch screen. 
After having been trained to a hierarchically ordered sequence of five differently coloured 
squares, the birds were presented with an unknown pair of two non-adjacent colours. The 
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jackdaws were able to infer the relationship according to the previously learnt hierarchical 
order. 
In summary, all three test species showed remarkable cognitive skills that are 
comparable to that of primates. However, there was no clear pattern with regard to different 
cognitive abilities of corvids and parrots, rather large individual differences appeared within 
each species. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Während die kognitiven Fähigkeiten von Primaten sowohl im technischen als auch im 
sozialen Bereich bereits gut erforscht sind, ist noch relativ wenig über die Fähigkeiten von 
Vögeln bekannt. In letzter Zeit gab es einige Studien die zeigten, dass Vögel ähnliche 
kognitive Fähigkeiten wie Primaten besitzen. Aufgrund dessen, war es Ziel meiner 
Dissertation zum besseren Verständnis der kognitiven Fähigkeiten vor allem von 
Krähenvögeln und Papageien beizutragen.  
Im Bereich der technischen Kognition steht oftmals die Fähigkeit Entscheidungen 
durch Ausschluss zu treffen, im Fokus von Untersuchungen. Ich testete Rabenkrähen (Corvus 
corone corone) in einem solchen Experiment, in dem eine Belohnung unter einem von zwei 
Bechern versteckt war und die Vögel nur visuelle Informationen darüber bekamen, welcher 
Becher leer war. Ein Individuum wählte korrekt, während andere den Effekt der lokalen 
Verstärkung zeigten, in dem sie den leeren, angehobenen Becher bevorzugten. In einem 
Folgeexperiment, in dem die Bewegung der Becher kontrolliert wurde, waren mehr Vögel im 
Stande die falsche Möglichkeit auszuschließen. 
Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen, testete ich Rabenkrähen, Graupapageien (Psittacus 
erithacus) und Dohlen (Corvus monedula) in einem modifizierten Experiment, in dem zwei 
Belohnungen verwendet wurden und die Vögel die volle Information über das Futterversteck 
bekamen. Alle drei Arten zeigten einen starken Effekt von lokaler Verstärkung, indem sie den 
einzigen oder zuletzt manipulierten Becher bevorzugten, unabhängig davon ob dieser Futter 
beeinhaltete oder nicht. 
Zusätzlich testete ich Graupapageien in einem Versuch zur „Folgerung durch 
Ausschluss“, in dem der korrekte Becher nur durch Schlußfolgerung und nicht durch 
Vermeidung des leeren Bechers gewählt werden konnte. Ein Individuum war im Stande auf 
den korrekten Becher zu schließen und ist damit der erste Vogel, bei dem diese Fähigkeit 
nachgewiesen werden konnte. 
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Abschließend testete ich Dohlen an einem Computer mit berührungsempfindlichen 
Bildschirm auf die Fähigkeit hin transitive Schlussfolgerungen zu ziehen. Nachdem die Vögel 
eine hierarchische Folge von fünf unterschiedlich farbigen Quadraten gelernt hatten, wurden 
sie im Test mit zwei nicht benachbarten Farben konfrontiert. Die Dohlen waren im Stande die 
Beziehung gemäß der vorher gelernten Reihenfolge abzuleiten. 
 Zusammenfassend ist zu sagen, dass alle drei getesteten Arten bemerkenswerte 
kognitive Fähigkeiten zeigten ähnlich denen von Primaten. Allerdings gab es kein klares 
Muster im Bezug auf unterschiedliche kognitive Fähigkeiten von Krähenvögeln und 
Papageien, vielmehr traten interessanterweise große individuelle Unterschiede in allen Arten 
auf. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Animals that are fittest are those most likely to survive, reproduce, and pass on their genes 
(Darwin 1859). The fitness of many vertebrates is strongly influenced by their highly 
developed cognition and the ability to learn and adapt. Over the last decades different 
cognitive and learning mechanisms, relevant to the physical and social environment of an 
organism have been revealed (for a review see Kirkpatrick and Hall 2008).  
One mechanism which builds on these learning mechanisms, and is sometimes 
considered the pinnacle of human intelligence, is the ability to reason. Reasoning offers high 
levels of flexibility but in turn creates costs due to its complexity. Therefore, the ability of 
animals to use reasoning and the adaptiveness of reasoning have been hotly debated (Bird and 
Emery 2009; Call 2004, 2006; Penn and Povinelli 2007a, b; Pepperberg 1999; Povinelli 2000; 
Visalberghi and Tomasello 1998). One point that appears to be certain, though, is that if any 
animal species were able to use reasoning, these would be amongst the most cognitively 
advanced families, such as primates, canids, cetaceans, corvids, or parrots. Therefore, the 
present dissertation aims at furthering the knowledge of the cognitive processes involved in 
causal reasoning of two highly cognitive bird families, corvids Corvidae and parrots 
Psittacidae. 
First I will provide an overview of the learning mechanisms and types of reasoning 
used by animals in general and birds in specific. Next, an account will be given of the 
evidence showing physical compared to social cognition in corvids and parrots, followed by a 
theoretical framework of the cognitive abilities displayed by these two families. This chapter 
will conclude with an overview of the structure and intent of the present thesis. 
 
12 
 
Learning and reasoning 
About a century ago the concept of animal intelligence was restricted to simple learning 
mechanisms, several of which have been identified in vertebrates. The simplest of these is 
usually considered to be habituation, which refers to the reduction or cessation of a reaction in 
response to a particular stimulus without the presence of a reward (Hinde 1970). 
The effects of habituation diminish in a process called dishabituation when for an extended 
period of time the stimulus is no longer present (Kirkpatrick and Hall 2008). 
A group of several learning mechanisms which are based on the receiving of rewards 
in response to certain situations or actions is referred to as associative learning. One such 
mechanism is classical conditioning which was first described by Pavlov (1903, 1927). 
Classical conditioning refers to learning based on the formation of associative connections 
between an innately positive stimulus and a neutral stimulus. When the neutral stimulus 
becomes associated with the positive stimulus by repeated simultaneous presentation, the 
reaction towards the neutral stimulus changes to match the reaction that was previously only 
shown towards the positive stimulus. Thus an association is formed between a stimulus and 
the receiving of a reward. 
Another form of conditioning called operant or instrumental conditioning (Thorndike 
1911) refers to the formation of associations between an action oneself performs and a 
reward, rather than between a stimulus and a reward. Here the timely presentation of a reward 
or punishment following an action leads to learning of positive or negative association 
respectively. Operant conditioning is often tested in a conditioning chamber or Skinner box 
(Skinner 1938) which automatically presents rewards following an action such as a lever 
press or peck on a pecking key or touchscreen. 
If operant conditioning takes place outside a structured environment so that the 
solution that leads to the reward is encountered by chance, it is often referred to as trial and 
error learning. Here, the animal learns about the characteristics of the environment, may these 
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be in the physical, social, or of any other domain, by coincidentally directly experiencing the 
effects of its own actions and classing the outcome as positive or negative. In Thorndike’s 
(1911) classical experiment demonstrating operant conditioning, for example, he locked cats 
Felis silvestris in a puzzle-box. The cats managed to escape from the box by trial and error 
exploration. The positive outcome led the cats to repeat their previously discovered actions 
when repeatedly presented with the same situation. With time the actions leading to the 
escape were performed very quickly and efficiently demonstrating that the cats had learnt a 
solution to a problem which they had originally encountered by chance. 
While these simple learning mechanisms are the basis for much of the behaviour 
changes we can observe in non-human animals as well as humans, later studies have shown a 
steadily increasing interest in more advanced cognition (Jolly 1966; McGonigle and Chalmers 
1977; Premack 1976). One form of learning which is not founded on simple associative 
processes is said to be based on insight. Insight is defined as the solving of a novel problem 
without the opportunity to use trial and error learning and, thus, to solve the problem by 
purely internal reasoning and not by external exploration (Kirkpatrick and Hall 2008). When 
learning occurs based on solutions found through insight this is referred to as insightful 
learning (Reznikova 2007). For example, if a bird, through insight, understands that it can 
reach a reward by using a stick this discovery is likely to lead to the learning of the situation 
and with that to the immediate use of the stick in comparable future situation. In contrast, 
observational causal learning describes the opposite process (Meltzoff et al. 2012). Here, the 
observation of the causal relationships appearing in the world leads to understanding and 
insight. For example, if a bird observes that water in a tube is raised by falling stones it might 
at some point understand that it can use this principle to float up a reward which was 
previously unreachable. 
Furthermore, insight can be considered a prerequisite for reasoning (Call 2004) which 
enables the animal to draw conclusions based on the available information. As such, insight is 
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the moment of realization of an abstract principle, whereas reasoning is the mental process 
which uses insight. Given the many different situations in which reasoning can be applied 
there are several different types of reasoning. Causal reasoning, for example, explores cause 
and effect relationships (Emery and Clayton 2004; Visalberghi and Tomasello 1998) such as 
reasoning about the consequences of actions. A special form of causal reasoning is inference 
by exclusion which refers to the ability to deduce information about one unavailable entity 
from the available information of another entity (Call 2006). Similarly, analogical reasoning 
refers to the ability to make equivalence judgements between different sets of stimuli (Pearce 
2008; Taylor et al. 2009) such as transferring the relationship of one pair of stimuli onto 
another pair.  
Recent studies have provided evidence for the existence of both insight learning and 
observational causal learning by showing that learning might be a prerequisite for insight 
(Meltzoff et al. 2012; von Bayern et al. 2009) and that insight in turn can lead to learning 
(Bugnyar et al. 2007; Emery and Clayton 2001). As reasoning seems to be directly linked to 
insight, it appears somewhat arbitrary to draw a very clear line between the concepts of 
learning and reasoning and to view these as independent. The present thesis acknowledges the 
interconnection between the two concepts and does not attempt to present them as separate. 
When, hereafter, referring to reasoning, the internal logical thought process is meant and 
when referring to learning, a process of acquisition is meant, while always recognizing the 
relationship between the two processes. 
Whether animals are generally able to use insight and reasoning or whether this ability 
is uniquely human has been hotly debated (Bird and Emery 2009; Call 2004, 2006; Penn and 
Povinelli 2007a, b; Pepperberg 1999; Povinelli 2000; Visalberghi and Tomasello 1998). 
However, before any debate about the presence or absence of insight can be initiated, it is 
necessary to exclude the possibility that a certain task has been affected by low-level 
mechanisms such as associative learning and local or stimulus enhancement. The strong effect 
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that local enhancement can have on, for example, dogs Canis familiaris has been 
demonstrated by Erdöhegyi (2007). This study showed that low-level mechanisms can in fact 
be so strong that they can mask the cognitive performance that an animal might be able to 
show on a complex task. Therefore, the consideration of any possible low-level mechanisms 
is particularly important when interpreting negative results. 
Nevertheless, the capability for reasoning was first suggested in Great apes (Call 2004, 
2006; Premack and Premack 1994). Call (2004), for example, tested apes on a variety of cup-
lifting and tin-shaking tasks. The apes were able to find the location of food based on 
information about a location that did not contain any food. Similarly, several studies claim 
that reasoning has also been shown in corvids (Bird and Emery 2009; Bugnyar 2007; Weir et 
al. 2002) and parrots (Pepperberg 1999, 2006a).  
In all of the above studies the animals had some previous experience with the 
materials which were used in the task, even though these materials were never before 
combined and presented in the same way as they were during the task. Penn and Povinelli 
(2007a) claim that the separate behavioural components of this pre-experience could have 
been acquired through associative learning in all of the above studies. Based on this they state 
that the animals could have given the superficial impression of using insight by simply putting 
together components of information and skill that they have previously learnt by trial and 
error exploration. Furthermore, they claim that there is no evidence to date that shows a non-
human animal using insight learning, and, on these grounds, reject the hypothesis that non-
human animals are capable of operating on the basis of insight. Additionally, they state that 
causal reasoning is so entwined with analogical reasoning that it cannot be separated based on 
experimental approaches. 
In support of this argument Epstein (1984) replicated a study by Köhler (1925). 
Köhler’s original data suggested insightful behaviour of chimpanzees Pan troglodytes as his 
subjects were able to push a box into the correct position to be able to reach a banana 
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suspended from the ceiling. Training pigeons Columba livia to independently push a box and 
peck a banana for food and by later combining the two skills in a test, Epstein showed that 
what was interpreted as insight in the chimpanzees could be based on previous experience and 
associative learning. However, this does not necessarily mean that the chimpanzees did not 
use reasoning to solve the problem, but simply that it is also possible to solve the problem 
using methods other than reasoning. Given the available evidence, it is impossible to 
determine which mechanism was used by Köhler’s chimpanzees. 
Pre-experience with the relevant elements of this world, however, lays the grounds on 
which reasoning is built. Thus, carefully designed follow-up studies aimed at excluding the 
possibility that the pre-experience which was required for solving the tasks provided in the 
initial studies on animal reasoning was based on associative learning of the separate 
components of the tasks. Hanus and Call (2011) and Schrauf and Call (2011) lend support to 
the notion that reasoning is possible in non-human animals by showing that causal 
discriminations are achieved more easily than arbitrary ones. Both studies showed that Great 
apes were much more successful at identifying an opaque target container when the 
distinctive feature was weight rather than colour. According to Penn and Povinelli’s (2007a) 
hypothesis that any potential insight shown in animals is based directly on previous 
associative learning, there should have been no difference in the speed of understanding 
weight discriminations compared to colour discriminations. Thus, Schrauf and Call (2011) 
and Hanus and Call’s (2011) results suggest that the apes have an internal representation of 
the food and the fact that food has a certain weight. Similarly, Taylor et al. (2009) 
demonstrated both causal and analogical reasoning by showing that New Caledonian crows 
Corvus moneduloides were able to transfer knowledge learnt on a trap-tube task to a trap-table 
task. As the birds had no previous experience with any of the parts of the manipulations 
needed to solve the trap-table problem, the use of previous associative learning can be 
excluded. 
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To conclude, the topic of whether insight has as yet been demonstrated in animals is 
hotly debated. However, recent studies lend strong support to the idea that insight is indeed 
possible in non-human animals. Areas of cognition which are likely to benefit from the ability 
to reason are social and physical cognition. The next section of this chapter will introduce 
these concepts and explain how reasoning is helping birds in their interactions with their 
physical surroundings and their interactions with other members of their social group. 
 
Reasoning in the physical and social domain 
Within the broad field of comparative cognition there are different sub-domains, such as 
physical and social cognition. While some animals appear to be masters within one particular 
area, others tend to perform well on a whole range of tasks. To date it is not clear whether the 
performance within the separate domains is solely dependent on the immediate adaptive value 
for that particular species or whether a more general process is in operation. The existence of 
a general intelligence (g) has been suggested in a notion previously known from the human 
intelligence literature (Spearman 1904) and only recently adopted for an animal model 
(Banerjee et al. 2009; Galsworthy et al. 2002; Matzel et al. 2003; Plomin 2001; Reader et al. 
2011). General intelligence defines the overall intelligence of individuals within a species 
across cognitive domains. Those species whose individuals have a high g-score should 
perform well on a whole range of cognitive tasks, including social and physical cognition 
tests. This should be relatively independent of the immediate ecological needs of the species. 
One of these specific domains, physical cognition, refers to the knowledge of how the 
physical world works (Shettleworth 2010). It contains a common sense understanding of 
shapes, weight, movability of items, spatial locations, and so on. This type of knowledge is 
often referred to as ‘folk physics’ (Povinelli 2000) and was examined with physical cognition 
experiments testing food finding, tool use, means-end understanding, and spatial navigation 
abilities. When attempting to understand how the physical world works and how its parts 
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interact with each other, the ability to reason logically is invaluable. It enables an animal to 
avoid lengthy trial and error learning every time a new but conceptually similar problem is 
encountered. In contrast, the animal would be able to jump straight to the logical solution 
without expending valuable energy or even risking health and safety in exploration. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the ability to reason would be an advantageous and adaptive 
trait in the physical domain. 
 Furthermore, social cognition is concerned with all social interactions and 
relationships between individuals (Fitch et al. 2010; Shettleworth 2010). The importance of 
this is particularly obvious in group-living animals such as corvids or parrots. Birds that form 
large groups are likely to profit from social learning because it increases learning speed and 
efficiency, and reduces foraging risks. This means they benefit from learning based on the 
observation of conspecifics rather than attempting to learn everything by individual trial and 
error learning. Furthermore, a prerequisite for group living is an understanding about group 
dynamics, such as a hierarchical order of individuals. 
The social intelligence hypothesis (Humphrey 1976; Jolly 1966) states that social 
cognition has developed as an adaptation for group living. Accordingly, social animals or 
those that have been social in their recent evolutionary past should be much better at using 
social cognition than solitary animals. However, to date there have been two studies (Fiorito 
and Scotto 1992; Wilkinson et al. 2010) that showed social learning in non-social species 
suggesting that social learning might be based on a general ability to learn rather than on an 
adaptation for group living. The social complexity hypothesis (Balda and Kamil 1989; de 
Waal and Tyack 2003) goes one step further by stating that the level of complexity within a 
social network should reflect the extent of the species’ cognitive abilities. There is evidence 
showing that species with highly complex social structures learn more efficiently and quickly 
than closely related species with a less complex social structure (Bond et al. 2003; Bond et al. 
2010; Maclean et al. 2008). Despite the debate about its exclusivity, social learning is 
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unquestionably a very useful and important tool for those species that do have close social 
bonds. 
     The ability to reason is likely to be of great advantage when dealing with social 
cognition problems. For example, animals need to understand and remember the hierarchy 
within their group. The ability to observe and understand the social relationships of other 
group members might enable an animal to infer its own position, particularly in relation to 
higher-ranking individuals, and to, thus avoid potentially harmful hierarchy fights. Inferences 
such as these are referred to as transitive inference (Bryant and Trabasso 1971). 
Reasoning can be a useful tool not only in selected, artificial incidences but also in 
complex situations involving both manipulations of the physical world and interactions with 
social partners. Schmelz (2011), for example, showed that chimpanzees are able to infer that 
other chimpanzees know about the physical properties of their environment, in this case about 
food hidden under a slanted versus a flat board. 
Reasoning has been proven to be a useful tool in interactions with both the physical 
and the social world. Accordingly, it seems like it might be a useful tool for those animals that 
are cognitively advanced, despite its cost and complexity. Two such bird families are corvids 
and parrots and the following section will elaborate on their cognitive abilities and their 
potential convergent evolution with Great apes. 
 
Corvids and parrots 
Some decades ago the opinion of bird intelligence was less than favourable. Their cognitive 
abilities were believed to be in no means comparable to those of mammals (Herrick 1924). 
However, nowadays this unfortunate misconception has been repeatedly and thoroughly 
disproven. One reason for the belief that birds were unequal to mammals might be the fact 
that the bird brain is structurally very different form the mammalian brain. Today, it is known 
that the cognitive abilities of birds are located in different brain regions than those of 
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mammals but are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable (Emery 2006; Reiner et al. 
2004). 
Amongst the birds two families, corvids and parrots stand out with respect to their 
cognitive abilities (Emery and Clayton 2004). In fact, the abilities of the members of these 
two families have been shown to be very comparable, if not sometimes superior, to those of 
even the most cognitively advanced mammals, the Great apes (Emery 2006). The process in 
which these striking similarities are believed to have evolved in these distantly related species 
is referred to as convergent evolution. This means that comparable or equal cognitive abilities 
have developed in a parallel, analogue manner based on environmental demands without 
having a common route in a shared ancestor (Ryan 2008). 
Support for the convergent evolution hypothesis and the immense cognitive abilities 
of birds has been found in the testing of numerous different paradigms and tasks in several 
different corvid species. Carrion crows Corvus corone corone have demonstrated impressive 
abilities such as refraining from immediate gratification in exchange for a later, more desired 
reward (Dufour et al. 2011; Wascher et al. 2012a) and distinguishing between individuals 
based on acoustic information (Wascher et al. 2012b). Jackdaws Corvus monedula have been 
proven to be sensitive to social information and show great capabilities in social learning 
(Scheid et al. 2007; Schwab et al. 2008). New Caledonian crows are known to have very 
strong tool use abilities (e.g. Hunt 1996; Weir et al. 2002; Weir and Kacelnik 2006) and have 
been shown to perform well in causal and analogical reasoning tasks (Taylor et al. 2009). 
Ravens Corvus corax have demonstrated competencies in a whole array of tasks involving 
social and physical cognition (Boeckle and Bugnyar 2012; Bugnyar 2011; Heinrich 1995; 
Schloegl et al. 2009). Bugnyar (2007) even claims to have found them capable of forming 
theory-of-mind-like concepts suggesting a very high level of insight. 
Further striking evidence of the cognitive abilities of birds was derived from 
experiments testing different parrot species. Keas Nestor notabilis, for example, have shown 
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great physical cognition abilities, mastering even very complex tasks innovatively using a 
large variety of actions such as twisting, pulling, pushing, and many more (Huber and Gajdon 
2006; O'Hara et al. 2012). Furthermore, African grey parrots Psittacus erithacus have 
demonstrated extraordinary cognitive abilities in both the social and physical domain 
(Pepperberg 1999, 2008; Peron et al. 2011). To mention just one example, the pioneer of Grey 
parrot cognition research, Irene Pepperberg, showed that her famous parrot Alex has even 
developed numerical skills involving a zero-like concept (Pepperberg and Gordon 2005) and 
addition abilities (Pepperberg 2012).  Alex showed the ability to form and reason about 
abstract representations of, for example, quantities being represented by both words and 
written letters (Pepperberg 2006a, b). This lends support to the hypothesis that African grey 
parrots are able to use reasoning. 
To conclude, corvids and parrots have been shown to have very advanced cognitive 
skills. Several studies have even shown good indications that reasoning in animals might be 
possible. However, further studies are needed to extend these findings. The present thesis has 
aimed at making a significant contribution towards filling these gaps and extending the base 
of knowledge in this area. The following section will demonstrate why this is so by explaining 
the structure of the present dissertation and introducing the major study questions and 
hypotheses. 
 
Aims and structure of this thesis 
The present thesis focused on the study of reasoning in birds in general, and corvids and 
parrots in particular. After the present brief overview of the theoretical background of 
reasoning and insight, the study presented in Chapter 2 aimed at solidifying the foundation of 
knowledge underlying the study of reasoning in carrion crows. It, firstly, tested whether 
carrion crows are able to succeed in making exclusion judgements. Secondly, it explored the 
general effects of local enhancement and its effects on exclusion performance tasks in 
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particular. One of the findings was that local enhancement had a striking effect on the 
performance of the crows. 
 Previous studies on ravens, jackdaws, keas and African grey parrots tested in a setup 
directly comparable to that described in Chapter 2 had shown different effects of local 
enhancement (Schloegl et al. 2009; Schloegl 2011; Schmidt et al. unpubl.). To determine the 
differential influence local enhancement may have on the cognitive performance of the 
different species, the study described in Chapter 3 extended the local enhancement test 
paradigm used with carrion crows in Chapter 2 to jackdaws and Grey parrots. 
 Chapter 4 aimed at clarifying which mechanism exactly was used by African grey 
parrots when attempting to solve an exclusion task. To date most studies testing exclusion 
performance in birds have not controlled for the possibility that the task might be solved by 
avoidance rather than causal reasoning. The study described in Chapter 4 was designed to 
avoid this shortcoming and to answer the question of whether Grey parrots are able to show 
inference by exclusion. 
 While those corvid species that cache food have been shown to be very proficient in 
physical cognition tasks (Schloegl et al. 2009), the jackdaw, a non-caching corvid species, has 
encountered difficulties in, for example, exclusion tasks (Schloegl 2011). However, as 
jackdaws are closely related to the other corvid species there is no reason to assume that their 
general cognitive abilities and reasoning skills are much lower than those found in their 
relatives. Jackdaws have been shown to be particularly sensitive to social information and to 
perform well in social learning tasks (Scheid et al. 2007; Schwab et al. 2008). Thus, the study 
described in Chapter 5 examined the reasoning skills of jackdaws in a task relevant for the 
social domain rather than the physical domain – transitive inference. As such, Chapter 5 
aimed at taking the ecology of the test species into account when choosing the experimental 
test paradigm. 
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 Finally, Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the main findings and conclusions drawn 
from the studies presented in Chapter 2 to 5, and embeds them in the theoretical framework.  
Implications of the current findings and future directions are discussed. 
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Abstract 
Recently, two corvid species, food-caching ravens and non-caching jackdaws, have been 
tested in an exclusion performance (EP) task. While the ravens chose by exclusion, the 
jackdaws did not. Thus, foraging behaviour may affect EP-abilities. To investigate this 
possibility, another food-caching corvid species, the carrion crow (Corvus corone corone), 
was tested in the same exclusion task. We hid food under one of two cups and subsequently 
lifted either both cups, or the baited or the un-baited cup. The crows were significantly above 
chance when both cups were lifted or when only the baited cup was lifted. When the empty 
cup was lifted, we found considerable inter-individual variation, with some birds having a 
significant preference for the un-baited but manipulated cup. In a follow-up task, we always 
provided the birds with the full information about the food location, but manipulated in which 
order they saw the hiding or the removal of food. Interestingly, they strongly preferred the 
cup which was manipulated last, even if it did not contain any food. Therefore we repeated 
the first experiment but controlled for the movement of the cups. In this case, more crows 
found the food reliably in the un-baited condition. We conclude that carrion crows are able to 
choose by exclusion, but local enhancement has a strong influence on their performance and 
may overshadow potential inferential abilities. However, these findings support the 
hypothesis that caching might be a key to exclusion in corvids. 
 
Keywords 
carrion crow; exclusion performance; local enhancement; two-choice task; reasoning
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Introduction 
Exclusion performance (EP) is defined as “selecting the correct alternative by logically 
excluding other potential alternatives” (Call 2006). To test for this ability, a two choice task is 
commonly used, in which the animal is confronted with two options, A and B. Then it is 
informed that one option, say B, is incorrect (i.e. un-baited). Two possible approaches can 
lead to the correct choice of A. Either the individual avoids the incorrect option and therefore, 
its choice is only based on knowledge about B (Aust et al. 2008), or it is aware that option A 
is correct because B is not, i.e. that the food is in cup A because B is empty. The latter 
mechanism has been labelled “inference by exclusion” (Call 2004, 2006) or “reasoning by 
exclusion” (Erdöhegyi et al. 2007) and is presumably cognitively more demanding than the 
first one. 
Originally, EP has been discussed as a learning mechanism facilitating the acquisition 
of language in humans (Dixon 1977; Markman and Wachtel 1988) and therefore, many 
language-trained animals have been tested. Sea lions Zalophus californianus (Schustermann 
and Krieger 1984), bottlenose dolphins Tursiops truncatus (Hermann et al. 1984), dogs Canis 
familiaris (Kaminski et al. 2004; Pilley and Reid 2011) and an African grey parrot Psittacus 
erithacus (Pepperberg 2006) had been trained to associate various objects with verbal labels. 
When confronted with a set of familiar objects and one new object, they matched the new 
object with a new, unknown label. This suggests that their choice was based on the exclusion 
of the known objects. Interestingly, they could also memorize and learn the meaning of these 
new labels through exclusion (Bloom 2004; Markman and Abelev 2004; Fischer et al. 2004). 
EP may not be restricted to vocal learning but may also facilitate the performance in 
forced discrimination tasks. For instance, in a matching-to-sample (MTS) task, animals are 
trained to match several objects as correct and others as incorrect. Finally, an already known 
incorrect object is matched with a new object, so that a correct choice of the new object would 
need to be based on exclusion. In such a task, chimpanzees Pan troglodytes (Beran and 
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Washburn 2002; Tomonaga 1993), sea lions (Kastak and Schustermann 2002), dogs (Aust et 
al. 2008) and pigeons Columba livia (Aust et al. 2008; Clement and Zentall 2003) were able 
to match a new object via exclusion; additionally pigeons also showed EP in a similar non-
matching-to-sample task (Zentall et al. 1981). 
In an influential study, Call (2004) devised a food-finding task to test for exclusion. 
This task cannot distinguish unequivocally between exclusion based on true inference about 
the correct option and exclusion based on avoidance of the incorrect option (Paukner et al. 
2009); still, it provides an easy-to-use tool to compare various species in an ecologically more 
relevant context than the before-mentioned test designs. In this task, an experimenter hid a 
food reward in one of two boxes and then provided the subjects with different information by 
opening either one or both boxes. Hence, when only the content of the un-baited box was 
shown to the animals, they had to exclude this box and choose the opposite box to find the 
hidden food. The Great Apes (Call 2004) and several monkeys (capuchin monkeys Cebus 
apella (Paukner et al. 2006; Paukner et al. 2009; Sabbatini and Visalberghi 2008); Tonkean 
macaques Macaca tonkeana (Petit et al. 2005); and baboons Papio hamadryas anubis 
(Schmitt and Fischer 2009)) showed strong evidence for the ability to choose by exclusion, 
whereas dogs (Bräuer et al. 2006; Erdöhegyi et al. 2007) are only able to do so under very 
specific circumstances.  
Taken together, a diverse range of species demonstrated EP in very different 
experiments, but it is not clear if they show EP in certain contexts only or if they can apply 
this ability broadly across various contexts (Schloegl et al. 2009a). The first case would be in 
line with the “adaptive specialisation hypothesis”, which aims to explain the evolution of 
intelligence in general and suggests that each species evolved specific cognitive abilities in 
adaptation to their socio-ecology (de Kort and Clayton 2006; Kamil 1987); the second case 
would support the “general process view”, which proposes a wider set of cognitive abilities as 
a consequence of the evolution of large brains (Bolhuis and Macphail 2001). 
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When Schloegl et al. (2009b) conducted the above mentioned food-finding task in 
birds, they found that ravens Corvus corax, but not keas, Nestor notabilis, were able to choose 
by exclusion. One might speculate that this finding represents a cognitive difference between 
two distantly related taxa (Hackett et al. 2008), but both groups are commonly assumed to 
possess advanced levels of cognitive abilities (Emery 2006). Alternatively, ecological 
differences may explain the differences between the two species, as ravens cache food and 
pilfer the caches of others (Heinrich 1989), whereas keas do not cache at all. It had been 
suggested that feeding ecology could affect the prevalence of EP in corvids (Schloegl et al. 
2009b), as cachers are frequently confronted with pilfering, and consequently empty cache 
sites; thus, the sight of an empty food location may inform a cacher about the fate of food that 
had been present before, whereas the same may not be true for a non-caching species. This 
argument is supported not only by the finding that non-caching jackdaws Corvus monedula 
fail to show EP in the same test paradigm in which ravens had been successful (Schloegl 
2011), but also from another, unrelated foraging task in which jackdaws used information 
about the absence of food differently than related, food caching jays (Gould-Beierle 2000).  
Thus, the currently available data support the adaptive specialisation hypothesis to 
explain the prevalence of EP in corvids, but further studies on more species are clearly 
needed, as only one caching species has been tested so far. Carrion crows (Corvus corone 
corone) are closely related to ravens, possess a similar social organisation and do cache food, 
although a bit more seasonal than ravens (Goodwin 1986; dos Anjos et al. 2009). Therefore, 
this species is an ideal candidate for further studies and similar test set-ups to that used in 
ravens and jackdaws seem to be feasible. We here conducted a series of experiments to test 
the exclusion abilities of carrion crows. First, we replicated the previous studies of Schloegl 
and co-workers; this was followed by two follow-up experiments, in which we aimed to test 
and to control for the effect of local enhancement, as this had been shown to mask exclusion 
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abilities in dogs (Erdöhegyi et al. 2007), We predicted that the crows would perform similar 
to ravens and choose by exclusion if caching may indeed be linked to EP in corvids. 
 
Experiment 1: cup-lifting 
Methods 
Subjects 
Seven hand-raised carrion crows (four males, three females, aged 0.5 - 20 years old), which 
were individually marked, participated in this study. They were housed in outdoor aviaries at 
the Konrad Lorenz Research Station in Grünau im Almtal, Austria. Two crows lived together 
as a pair in an aviary of approx. 14 m2 with a height of 2.5 m and the other 5 lived together 
with 2 not tested individuals in an aviary of approx. 47 m2 with an average height of 3 m.  
Both aviaries had natural vegetation like small bushes, grass and stones. Additionally, perches 
were affixed and naturally occurring obstacles and wooden walls provided hiding places. For 
testing, the crows were separated individually in one compartment of the aviary (12 and 10 
m
2
, respectively), which was open to all crows when not being tested. Although the test 
compartment was not visually isolated, none of the subjects was observed by other birds when 
being tested. The birds were fed once in the morning and tested in the late afternoon.  
 
Material 
A wooden platform (30 cm x 40 cm) was attached to the aviary’s outer wire mesh boundary 
in a height of 35 cm above ground; adjacent to it, another wooden platform (50 cm x 45 cm) 
was attached on the inner wire mesh boundary at the same height, on which the birds were 
able to sit during testing. Two identical plastic cups (6.5 cm in diameter and 7.5 cm in height) 
and a plastic platform (35 cm x 10 cm), which was free to move on the wooden platform, 
were used to present the setup (see Fig. 1). The reward was a piece of dried dog food, which 
is preferred by the crows but not available during normal feeding. 
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Figure 1: Basic test-set-up for all three experiments 
 
Procedure and design 
All experiments were conducted between May and September 2009. The crows were 
habituated to the apparatus before testing to avoid neophobic reactions during training and 
testing. 
Prior to testing all crows received a training phase to ensure that they reliably choose 
the baited cup when having seen were the reward was hidden. Here, the plastic platform was 
positioned on the outer wooden platform, approx. 10 cm away from the wire mesh. The 
experimenter (E; S.M.) visibly placed a reward on it and then simultaneously positioned the 
two cups on the platform in approx. 20 cm distance from each other, with one cup covering 
the reward.  The plastic platform was pushed to the wire mesh to allow the crow to make a 
choice by touching a cup with its beak. The chosen cup was lifted by E and the crow was 
allowed to take the reward by itself or to see the empty cup. The position of the reward (left / 
right) was semi-randomized, with the food on the same side for not more than two 
consecutive trials. The next trial started after 10-20 seconds when E had prepared the cups 
again. The crows received daily sessions consisting of ten trials each. They had to choose the 
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baited cup in at least eight out of ten trials in two consecutive sessions to advance to the test 
phase. 
In the test phase, the reward was hidden underneath one of the two cups below the 
wooden platform and out of view of the birds. The food was positioned randomly on the left 
or on the right, with the exception that it was not placed on the same side in more than two 
consecutive trials. The plastic platform with the two cups was then placed on the wooden 
platform in view but out of reach of the birds, approx. 10 cm away from the wire mesh. Then, 
one of the following conditions was conducted: 
Both E touched both cups with her hands simultaneously, lifted them to a height of 
approx. 20 cm above the platform and then returned the cups to the starting position. 
 Baited E touched both cups but lifted the baited cup only so that the food could be 
seen on the platform. During the presentation, E continued to touch the un-baited cup. 
 Un-baited As before, but now the empty cup was lifted. 
 Control No cup was lifted but both cups were touched by E. 
Each cue lasted for 5 seconds and E looked straight ahead throughout the trial to avoid 
unintentional cueing. Then, E pushed forward the plastic platform towards the wire mesh to 
allow the crow to make a choice; if it chose correctly, it received the reward; if it chose 
incorrectly, the empty cup was lifted. Following this procedure, E removed the plastic 
platform and the two cups from the wooden board without lifting the non-chosen cup, and the 
next trial began. The crows received 12 sessions, with 8 trials per session, consisting of two 
trials of each condition in randomized order. 
 
Data analysis 
All sessions were videotaped and later analysed from tape. Per trial, we measured whether the 
bird chose the baited or the un-baited cup. As the choice of a cup was unambiguous in any 
case, we did not calculate an inter-observer reliability. If the data were not normally 
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distributed, we applied non-parametric statistics. We tested for differences in percentage of 
correct choices between the conditions using a Friedman test. For post-hoc analysis we used 
the Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) method. The performance in the first half and in the 
second half of the experiment was compared using paired t-tests or Wilcoxon tests, as 
appropriate. To assess if the birds’ success rates differed from chance we used a Binomial 
test. All tests were conducted two-tailed and alpha was set to 0.05. Data analysis was 
conducted using Sigma Plot 11.0 and SPSS 11.5 for Windows. 
 
Results 
The crows received 40.0 ± 19.3 ( SDx ± ; range: 20 - 65) training-trials until they reached the 
criterion. In the test phase, the birds’ performance differed between the conditions (Friedman: 
N = 7, χ2 = 17.294, df = 3, P < 0.001). Post-hoc analyses revealed no significant difference 
between the both and the baited condition (SNK: both vs. baited: P > 0.05; Fig. 2), but the 
birds were significantly better in these two conditions than in the control and in the un-baited 
condition (SNK: all comparisons: P < 0.05; Fig. 2). In contrast, the control condition and the 
un-baited condition did not differ significantly from each other (SNK: un-baited vs. control: P 
> 0.05; Fig. 2). There was no significant improvement or decline over the course of the 
experiment in any condition (both: Wilcoxon: N = 7, T+ = 3.0, P = 1.0; all other comparisons: 
paired t-test: P ≥ 0.172). 
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Figure 2: Percentage of correct choices in experiment 1 and 3. The grey bars show the performance of the crows 
in experiment 1 and the white bars show their performance in experiment 3. The horizontal line indicates the 
chance level. The box plot shows the median and quartile. The whiskers represent 10% and 90% range, dots 
indicate 5% and 95% range. 
 
On an individual level, all birds selected the baited cup on the majority of the trials in the 
baited and in the both condition, with six of seven birds being significant in the both condition 
(Binomial-test: for these six birds, all P < 0.023, the seventh bird, P = 0.152); all birds 
significantly preferred the baited cup in the baited condition (Binomial-test: all P < 0.002). In 
the un-baited condition, one bird significantly preferred the baited cup (Binomial-test: P = 
0.002), whereas two crows had a significant preference for the un-baited cup (Binomial-test: 
both birds: P < 0.001). The other four birds were on chance level (Binomial-test: all P > 
0.152). In the control condition, all birds were on chance level (Binomial-test: all P > 0.307; 
Tab.1).  
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Table 1: Individual performances of the crows in experiment 1 and 3, given in percentage correct choices. 
Significant performances (according to a Binomial-test) are highlighted in bold. 
individual both baited un-baited control 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 3 Exp. 1 Exp. 3 Exp. 1 Exp. 3 Exp. 1 Exp. 3 
Baerchen 95.8 100.0 91.7 100.0 83.3 87.5 62.5 56.3 
Peter 66.7 100.0 91.7 87.5 62.5 50.0 45.8 37.5 
Hugo 91.7 93.8 87.5 100.0 45.8 31.3 45.8 43.8 
Gabi 75.0 87.5 83.3 68.8 41.7 56.3 50.0 37.5 
Klaus 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 12.5 75.0 45.8 37.5 
Toeffel 95.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 8.3 87.5 41.7 43.8 
Mate 91.7 - 87.5 - 66.7 - 41.7 - 
 
Discussion 
When the birds saw the food underneath one of the cups in the both and in the baited 
condition, nearly all of them performed above chance level. When only the un-baited cup was 
lifted, however, only one bird chose the baited cup significantly above chance. Thus, against 
our predictions the crows performed worse than the ravens. While four birds performed at 
chance in the un-baited condition, the two remaining birds had a significant preference for the 
manipulated, but un-baited cup. However, we found no improvement or decline over the 
course of the experiment. A similar preference for the lifted, but un-baited cup was found in 
dogs (Erdöhegyi et al. 2007). Apparently, local enhancement through the movement of a cup 
was a more salient cue for the dogs than the sight of the empty cup. The influence of human 
social cues or local enhancement on animals’ performances in choice tasks is well known. 
Apart from dogs, gorillas Gorilla gorilla (Peignot and Anderson 1999), chimpanzees (Itakura 
et al. 1999), wolves Canis lupus (Viranyi et al. 2008), horses Equus caballus (Krueger et al. 
2011) and goats Capra hircus (Kaminski et al. 2005) and at least two bird species, ravens 
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(Schloegl et al. 2008a) and Clark’s nutcrackers Nucifraga columbiana (Tornick et al. 2010), 
use touch cues or local enhancement to find hidden food in object-choice tasks.  
The question arising is whether the susceptibility to enhancement in our experiment is 
a result of the complexity of the EP task and the presumed advanced cognitive abilities 
required to solve it, or whether enhancement in general has such an impact on carrion crows. 
To answer this question, we ran a second experiment in which a reward was placed visibly 
under both cups and then different manipulations were performed in full view of the birds. 
Here, the reward was shown to them again and then either lay back under the cup or taken 
away. Additionally, a combination of both manipulations was performed with one of the 
rewards shown to the bird and the other reward taken away, or vice versa. We predict that 
under these circumstances, in which always the full information about the food location is 
provided, the birds would be less distracted by local enhancement and would be able to 
choose the baited cup in all conditions.  
 
Experiment 2: object manipulation 
Methods 
Subjects 
The seven birds from experiment 1 participated in this test. 
 
Material 
The same setup as in experiment 1 was used. 
 
Procedure 
This test was conducted in direct succession of the first experiment and without further 
training trials. Now, two rewards were placed on the board visibly and were then covered 
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with the cups. Thus, both cups were now baited. Then, one of the following manipulations 
was performed in full view of the birds: 
 Show (S) With one hand E lifted one of the cups to a height of approx. 20 cm and with 
the other hand she took the reward between her fingertips and clearly showed it to the bird. 
After this, she laid the reward back on the same position as before and covered it with the cup. 
 Take (T) As above, with the exception that the reward was taken away and put in E’s 
pocket after having been shown to the bird. 
 Show & Take (ST) Now, both cups were lifted sequentially. The reward underneath 
the first cup was shown to the bird (identical to “Show” manipulation), and the reward 
underneath the second cup was lifted and put in E’s pocket (identical to “Take” 
manipulation). 
 Take & Show (TS) As above, but the two manipulations were conducted in reversed 
order. 
Each manipulation was performed slowly (approx. 5 sec) and E assured that the bird watched 
the whole time. Then, the plastic platform was pushed forward and the bird was allowed to 
make a choice. After the bird had made its choice, the plastic platform and the cups remained 
on the board and a possibly remaining reward was removed in full view of the bird. The 
crows received nine sessions, with eight trials per session, consisting of two trials of each 
condition in randomized order. The cup (left or right) and the order of manipulations (left or 
right first) were randomly manipulated. 
Note that in the condition S, both cups were baited, but we were interested in how 
often the birds would choose the cup that had been manipulated. Therefore, in the S condition 
we scored whether the birds chose the manipulated cup, whereas in the other conditions we 
scored if they chose the baited cup. 
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Data analysis 
The birds’ choice was defined in the same way as in the first experiment. As the data were 
normally distributed, we used a one-way repeated measures ANOVA to test for differences 
between conditions. For post-hoc analysis we used the Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) 
method. To look for preferences for the manipulation of the cups we used a paired t-test. 
 
Results 
The performance of the birds differed between conditions (one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA: F6, 27 = 8.379, P = 0.001, Fig.3a). In condition S, where the food was shown again, 
the birds most frequently chose the manipulated cup, even though both cups contained food. 
In condition T the birds again preferentially chose the manipulated cup, even though it did not 
contain food. Consequently, they obtained food significantly more often in condition S than in 
condition T (SNK: P < 0.05). Similarly, they preferred the cup that was manipulated last when 
two manipulations were performed, even when they had seen the food being removed from 
underneath the second cup. This resulted in the birds choosing the baited cup significantly 
more often in the TS condition than in the ST condition (SNK: P < 0.05). Consequently, as 
the last manipulation appeared to be crucial, no significant difference was found between 
condition S and TS (SNK: P > 0.05) and between T and ST (SNK: P > 0.05). Furthermore, the 
birds’ performance was significantly better in the S condition than in the ST condition (SNK: 
P < 0.05) and significantly worse in the T than in the TS condition (SNK: P < 0.05). 
When combining the data of all four conditions, the crows chose the last (or only) handled 
cup significantly more often than the first (or untouched) cup (paired t-test: N = 7, t = 3.395, 
df = 6, P = 0.015, Fig.3b).  
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Figure 3: Preference for the manipulated cup in experiment 2. a) Percentage of correct choices in the four 
conditions of experiment 2. In the S condition we plotted the choice of the manipulated cup (note that the choice 
of both cups would have been correct), whereas in the other conditions we plotted the choice of the baited cup. 
b) Percentage of choices of the only or last manipulated cup and for the not or the first manipulated cup across 
all four conditions. The box plots show the median and quartile. The whiskers represent 10% and 90% range, 
dots indicate 5% and 95% range. 
 
Discussion 
In contrast to our predictions, the birds did not choose the baited cup reliably in all conditions. 
They were highly affected by the manipulation through the experimenter, and preferred the 
last (or only) handled cup even if the food had been removed from there. This preference for 
the ultimate object manipulated in a sequence of manipulations is known as recency effect 
(Pineno and Miller 2005) and has been found, among others, in monkeys (Wright et al. 1985), 
pigeons (Wright et al. 1985) as well as humans (Knoedler 1999). Although experiment 2 was 
easier to solve than the previous experiment, as the location of the food was never concealed, 
the impulse to choose the last manipulated cup was stronger than the knowledge about the 
food location itself. Interestingly, all individuals were equally affected and not only those two 
individuals who had shown a strong effect of local enhancement in experiment 1. 
Since enhancement had such a strong effect in experiment 2, we suggest that 
enhancement cues may have prevented the birds from choosing by exclusion in the first 
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experiment, i.e. in experiment 1 the birds may have experienced a conflict between making a 
choice according to the observed action (enhancement) or the observed absence of the food 
(exclusion); such a masking effect has been described previously for dogs in a very similar 
experiment (Erdöhegyi et al. 2007). These authors tried to control for the movement of the 
cups in a follow-up experiment, in which they positioned a smaller, opaque cup covering the 
food underneath one of the cups. Thereby, both external cups could be lifted while the food 
remained hidden. In this case, the dogs chose the correct cup when they had the choice 
between nothing (underneath the empty cup) and the internal cup (with the food underneath). 
However, this setup does not exclude that the dogs may have chosen the cup itself (i.e., as a 
toy) rather than because it contained the food. Also jackdaws showed a strong susceptibility 
to local enhancement in a similar setup; to control for a possible preference for the cup (as in 
the study on dogs), here two internal cups (one transparent, one opaque) were used (Schloegl 
2011). Therefore in our next experiment, we replicated this experiment to control for the 
movement of the cups. In detail, two additional smaller cups, transparent and opaque, were 
used underneath the normal cups. Then, always both external cups were lifted and the amount 
of information available in each condition was constructed through the combination (opaque 
or transparent) of the smaller cups. We predicted that the crows should base their choice on 
exclusion, if their failure in experiment 1 had indeed been due to a masking effect.  
 
Experiment 3: cup-lifting with inner cups 
Methods 
Subjects 
Six out of seven birds from experiment 1 and 2 participated in this task. One bird, Mate, 
refused to complete this task and was therefore excluded from the analyses. 
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Material 
The birds were tested in the same test compartment and with the same test platform as in 
experiment 1 and 2. In addition to the two cups from experiment 1 (external cups), four 
smaller plastic cups (4 cm in diameter and 4 cm in height), two of them laminated with dark 
tape to make them opaque, were used in this test.  
 
Procedure 
The third experiment was conducted in direct succession of experiment 2 again without any 
further training trials. The procedure was the same as in the first experiment with the 
exception that under the external cups always two smaller cups were placed and that both 
external cups were lifted (and returned to the board) in each condition. The information about 
the food location was given to the bird through the combination of the smaller cups used in 
each condition. According to experiment 1, conditions were performed as follows: 
 Both Two small transparent cups were used with a reward placed under one of them. 
 Baited A small transparent and a small opaque cup were used, with a reward placed 
under the transparent cup. 
 Un-baited As before, but with the exception that the reward was hidden underneath 
the small opaque cup. 
 Control Two small opaque cups were used with a reward hidden underneath one of 
them. 
The crows received eight sessions with eight trials per session, consisting of two trials of each 
condition in randomized order; we reduced the number of trials per condition because we 
were interested in a spontaneous change in choice behaviour.  
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Data analysis 
The birds’ choice was defined in the same way as in the previous experiments. To test for 
differences between conditions we used a one-way repeated measures ANOVA. For post-hoc 
analysis we used the Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) method. To compare the performances in 
experiments 1 and 3, we used a two-way repeated measures ANOVA (excluding the subject 
that participated in experiment 1 only) and Holm-Sidak tests (HS) for post-hoc analyses. 
 
Results 
The performance differed between the conditions (one-way repeated measures ANOVA: F5,23 
= 28.529; P < 0.001). Post-hoc analyses showed that as in experiment 1, the birds chose the 
baited cup significantly more often in the both and in the baited condition than in the control 
condition. (SNK: both vs. control: P < 0.05; baited vs. control: P < 0.05). Importantly and in 
contrast to experiment 1, the birds also selected the correct cup significantly more often in the 
un-baited condition than in the control condition (SNK: un-baited vs. control: P < 0.05; Fig. 
2). We found no significant difference between the both and the baited condition (SNK: both 
vs. baited: P > 0.05), but the birds were more successful in the baited and in the both 
condition than in the un-baited condition (SNK: both vs. un-baited: P < 0.05; baited vs. un-
baited: P < 0.05). Overall, there was no change detectable in the birds’ performance over the 
course of the experiment in any condition (comparison of first and second half of the 
experiment: both and baited-condition: Wilcoxon: P = 0.371; un-baited and control: paired t-
test: P ≥ 0.638). 
On an individual level all crows had a significant preference for the baited cup in the 
both condition (Binomial-test: P < 0.004) and five out of six birds had this preference also in 
the baited condition (Binomial-test: for these five birds, all P < 0.004, the sixth bird, P = 
0.210). The crow with a significant preference for the baited cup in the un-baited condition in 
experiment 1 kept its preference in experiment 3 (Binomial-test: P = 0.004). Those two crows 
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with a significant preference for the un-baited cup in the un-baited condition of experiment 1 
now switched to a preference for the baited cup (Binomial-test: P = 0.004 and P = 0.077, 
respectively), whereas those crows that where on chance level in experiment 1 continued to 
do so in experiment 3 (Binomial-test: P > 0.210). All crows performed on chance level in the 
control condition (Binomial-test: all: P > 0.454; Tab.1). 
To compare the performance of the birds between experiment 1 and 3, a two-way 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. A significant difference between the conditions 
(F5,47 = 45.447; P < 0.001), but neither between experiment 1 and 3 (F5,47 = 3.154, P = 0.136) 
nor an interaction of both factors (F5,47 = 1.747, P = 0.200) could be found. Post-hoc analyses 
(Holm-Sidak tests) revealed similar results as found in experiment 1, with no significant 
difference between the both and the baited condition (HS: both vs. baited: P = 0.950; Fig. 2), 
but these two conditions differed significantly from the control and the un-baited condition 
(HS: both vs. control: P < 0.001; both vs. un-baited: P < 0.001; baited vs. control: P < 0.001; 
baited vs. un-baited: P < 0.001; Fig. 2). In contrast, the control condition and the un-baited 
condition did not differ significantly (HS: un-baited vs. control: P > 0.163; Fig. 2). 
 
Discussion 
In this third experiment, the birds again performed at a high level in the both and in the baited 
condition. Although we found no significant difference between experiment 1 and 3, the 
birds’ performance in the un-baited condition increased. This is mostly due to the 
improvement of those two birds that had been influenced the most by local enhancement in 
the first experiment. Now, these two birds chose the baited cup when the food was hidden 
underneath the opaque cup and only the empty transparent cup was visible. Additionally, we 
could show that the improvement in the un-baited condition was most likely not influenced by 
learning, as we could not find a change between the first and the second half of the 
experiment. Though, it seems as if local enhancement had overshadowed the crows’ ability to 
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choose by exclusion in experiment 1. In comparison to the ravens, the carrion crows showed a 
similar ability to choose by exclusion, but seemed to be more sensitive to local enhancement.  
 
General discussion 
We here show that similar to ravens, jackdaws and keas, also carrion crows easily find hidden 
food in a two-choice task if they had seen it before they made their choice (Schloegl et al. 
2009b; Schloegl 2011). When only the information about the empty cup was provided and 
subjects would have to choose by exclusion, only one bird went for the baited cup 
spontaneously. This is in contrast to our findings in ravens (Schloegl et al. 2009b), and in 
contrast to our predictions. However, two other birds showed a preference for the lifted, un-
baited cup; when we controlled for the movement of the cups in experiment 3 they reversed 
their preference and chose the correct, baited cup. This allowed the birds as a group to be 
successful in the un-baited condition of experiment 3. Such a reversal was not found in a 
previous study in jackdaws (Schloegl 2011); this indicates that jackdaws and carrion crows 
were both distracted by the manipulations, but that exclusion abilities were masked in crows 
only. While absence of evidence should not be mistaken for evidence of absence, it is 
nevertheless striking that the jackdaws did not solve the identical tasks that ravens and crows 
mastered. At the very least this suggests that jackdaws – if capable of exclusion – rely less on 
this ability than the other two, closely related, species.  
Surprisingly, the strong enhancement effect was even more pronounced in experiment 
2, in which most birds were unable to inhibit their impulse to choose the cup handled last or 
only, even if they had seen that nothing was underneath. This strong effect of the 
manipulation of the cups in experiment 2 is most likely to be explained by local enhancement 
or an associative strategy: instead of associating a cup with the presence or the absence of 
food, they may have associated the number of presentations of food with a cup. For instance, 
in the T condition, the food was seen once underneath the correct cup, whereas it was seen 
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twice (at first presentation and at removal) at the incorrect cup (Russell and Thompson 2003). 
However, while this may explain the performance in the S and the T condition, it fails to 
explain the performance in the ST and TS conditions. 
Interestingly, the ravens’ susceptibility to the manipulation of the cups was less strong 
than that of the crows (Schloegl et al. 2009b), which may be due to their prior experimental 
experience. For the crows, the experiments described here were the first in which they were 
directly tested by an experimenter in a two-choice task. In contrast, the ravens have 
participated in a number of such choice tasks (Schloegl et al. 2008a, b) and were therefore 
more experienced than the crows. For African grey parrots Psittacus erithacus it is known 
that the experimental history of an individual could affect its performance in a subsequent 
experiment (Pepperberg 2007). Thus, different experimental histories of crows and ravens 
may have resulted in a stronger effect of the cup manipulation in the crows than in the ravens. 
Until recently inference was believed to be the mechanism underlying the ability to 
choose by exclusion. However, Paukner et al. (2009) and Schmitt and Fischer (2009) showed 
that other explanations are feasible. While it is indeed possible that animals have a mental 
representation of the food underneath the baited cup, they could also use a lower level 
cognitive function by simply avoiding the empty cup without knowing anything about the 
other cup. We cannot resolve which mechanisms the crows relied on to solve the task, but the 
high susceptible to low-level enhancement effects suggests that the birds may have been 
guided by low-level perceptual mechanisms, thus making avoidance the most likely 
explanation for the successful solution of the task. Furthermore, although we did not find a 
significant learning effect in the un-baited condition, it was notable that most of the errors 
occurred in the first half of the experiments. Thus, we cannot exclude a rapidly learned 
avoidance of the empty cup.   
Nevertheless, we can clearly demonstrate that carrion crows are capable of EP and 
even though their performance was somewhat weaker than those of ravens and more strongly 
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influenced by local enhancement, they performed better than the keas and jackdaws. Taking 
all these findings in consideration (Schloegl et al. 2009b; Schloegl 2011), our results are in 
line with the “adaptive specialisation hypothesis” (de Kort and Clayton 2006; Kamil 1987), 
suggesting that different feeding ecologies may have shaped the different performances in the 
EP task. In contrast to jackdaws and keas, ravens and crows are regularly faced with social 
interactions related to caching including pilfering and re-caching (Bugnyar and Kotrschal 
2002). This could also have led to an increased motivational and attentional state during food-
finding experiments. Similarly, it has been proposed that caching and non-caching species 
may value and interpret information about the absence of food differently and non-cachers 
may be more inclined to return to empty cache sites to see if the food had been replenished 
(Gould-Beierle 2000). Thus, it appears likely that feeding ecology plays an important role for 
the ability to choose by exclusion and more precisely, caching might be a key for EP in 
corvids.  
However, another possible explanation for EP in crows is the close phylogenetic 
relationship to ravens. Exclusion abilities may have emerged in corvids first after the split of 
the ancestor of present day jackdaws from the ancestor of present-day ravens and crows. To 
shed light on this issue, future studies need to investigate EP in other caching corvid species 
that are more distantly related to crows and ravens and, in particular, of the only other non-
caching species beside jackdaws, the white-throated magpie-jay Calocitta formosa (de Kort 
and Clayton 2006). Furthermore, future studies may incorporate additional parrot species to 
elucidate whether the performance of keas is representative for parrots.  
We should keep in mind that apart from food-caching corvids, also some non-caching 
mammals like chimpanzees (Call 2004), dolphins (Hermann et al. 1984) and sea lions (Kastak 
and Schustermann 2002) are able to use exclusion. Thus, there need to be alternative 
explanations why these animals possess these cognitive skills. Therefore caching as a key for 
exclusion could only be conceivable in corvids so far. 
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Abstract 
Being attentive to the behaviour of others may be advantageous to gain important information 
e.g., on the location of food. Often, this is achieved through simple local enhancement. 
However, this is not always beneficial, as it may override cognitive abilities, with negative 
consequences. Grey parrots and ravens have already succeed in exclusion tasks, but carrion 
crows do so only when controlling for local enhancement, and jackdaws fail entirely. 
Presently, we tested whether jackdaws would still be influenced by local enhancement in a 
simple choice-task. We compared their performance with those of Grey parrots. Since these 
birds did not respond to enhancement in the exclusion task, we expected them also to be less 
susceptible to enhancement here. In our tasks, two pieces of food were visibly hidden under 
two cups. Then one cup was lifted, the reward was shown to the bird and was either laid back 
underneath the cup or was removed. Alternatively, both manipulations were combined with 
the first reward being shown to the bird and the second one being removed or vice versa. 
Surprisingly, both species had a preference for the last handled cup, irrespective of whether it 
contained food or not. However, if the birds had to wait for ten seconds after the presentation, 
the jackdaws performed better than the Grey parrots. Additionally, the delay improved the 
performance of both species in conditions in which the reward was removed last and 
deteriorated their performance in conditions in which the item was shown last. 
 
Keywords  
African grey parrots, jackdaws, local enhancement, two-choice task, delay 
 
 
 
* This abstract has been used for the application of various scientific conferences and might be published in the 
internet and/or the abstract book of the respective conferences.
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Introduction 
The term “enhancement” is commonly used to describe an animal’s attention to a site or an 
object elicited by the presence of a conspecific at this site or the manipulation of an object by 
a demonstrator (Heyes et al. 2000). In the case of local enhancement the animal is attracted 
only to the object contacted by the demonstrator (Terkel 1995) whereas in the case of 
stimulus enhancement attention is directed to all objects of the same physical appearance 
(Fritz et al. 2000). Enhancement is a powerful, yet simple social learning mechanism and may 
facilitate the access to food resources (e.g.,Fritz and Kotrschal 1999; Krueger et al. 2011; 
Coleman and Mellgren 1997). This effect has been illustrated repeatedly in studies on rats in 
different contexts; Terkel (1995) found that young black rats Rattus rattus learned to feed on 
pine cones through local enhancement, as the young rats followed adults and continue to 
gnaw on half- stripped cones that had been left by them. Similarly, Norway rats Rattus 
norvegicus preferred food sites at which conspecifics had eaten previously (Laland and 
Plotkin 1991). Noteworthy, the enhanced attractiveness of a specific location due to the 
activity of a model is not restricted to intra-specific interactions; for instance, several studies 
showed that in a two-way object-choice task animals used the experimenter’s touch of an 
object as a reliable hint to choose that particular object (Itakura and Tanaka 1998; Byrnit 
2004; McKinley and Sambrook 2000; Tornick et al. 2010).  
However, local enhancement may not always be beneficial, as it may overshadow 
advanced cognitive abilities. Such a masking effect had been detected in an exclusion 
performance experiment conducted with dogs Canis familiaris (Erdöhegyi et al. 2007) and 
carrion crows Corvus corone corone (Mikolasch et al. 2012): Here, food was hidden in one of 
two boxes and the animals had to choose the baited box after an experimenter had lifted the 
other box to show that it is empty. Surprisingly, the dogs and a subset of the crows 
preferentially chose the manipulated but un-baited box. However, when controlling for the 
manipulation of the boxes in a follow-up experiment the animals were able to choose by 
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exclusion. Erdöhegyi et al. argued that a set of hierarchically ordered choice rules described 
the dogs’ behaviour best, suggesting that reasoning by exclusion is a lower-ranking strategy 
than responding to the social cue (touching of the box); similarly, we had suggested that local 
enhancement had masked the crows’ ability to choose by exclusion. 
In contrast to crows and dogs, jackdaws Corvus monedula were not able to choose by 
exclusion even under controlled test conditions, but were similarly susceptible to the 
manipulation of a cup (Schloegl 2011). In contrast, other species did not show a local 
enhancement effect in similar exclusion performance experiments (chimpanzees Pan 
troglodytes (Call 2004; Hill et al. 2011), bonobos Pan paniscus, Bornean orang-utans Pongo 
pygmaeus (Call 2004), Sumatran orang-utans Pongo abelii (Hill et al. 2011), capuchin 
monkeys Cebus apella (Heimbauer et al. 2012; Paukner et al. 2009; Sabbatini and Visalberghi 
2008), olive baboons Papio hamadryas anubis (Schmitt and Fischer 2009), ravens Corvus 
corax, keas Nestor notabilis (Schloegl et al. 2009), African grey parrots Psittacus erithacus 
(Schmidt et al. unpubl. data) and children Homo sapiens (Hill et al. 2012)).  
In the crow study mentioned above (Mikolasch et al. 2012), we also investigated if 
their reliance on local enhancement was a consequence of the cognitive burdens associated 
with the exclusion performance task. To do so, we conducted a simple “object manipulation” 
task in which the birds always received full information about the location of the food; we 
argued that if the crows had switched to an enhancement response because the task was (too) 
complicated, they should now rely on the visually available information about the presence of 
the food instead. Here two cups were baited in full view of the birds; after the initial baiting, 
one or both cups were manipulated by the experimenter with one manipulation consisting of 
again showing the food reward to the bird and laying it back under the cup and the other 
manipulation consisting of showing the reward to the bird and taking it away. Surprisingly, 
not only those individuals that were affected by the manipulation in the exclusion 
performance test were influenced by local enhancement, but all individuals preferred the only 
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or last handled cup, even if they had witnessed the removal of the reward from this cup. Thus, 
in this simple “object manipulation” task in which the full information about the food location 
was always provided, it was even more difficult for the birds to inhibit the impulse to choose 
the last manipulated cup. 
Due to the surprising performance of the crows in this task, we were interested how 
jackdaws, which were not able to solve the exclusion performance task and showed a strong 
preference for the manipulated cup, and Grey parrots, which evidently did not succumb to 
local enhancement, would fare in the “object manipulation” task. In a follow-up experiment 
we tested if the insertion of a time delay between cue presentation and choice would have an 
influence on the bird’s performance. This idea is based on the observation that a delay 
between stimulus presentation and choice induced pigeons Columba livia, rhesus monkeys 
Macaca mulatta and humans to switch from remembering the last item in a serial list best to 
remembering the first item in the list best (Wright et al. 1985). In consequence, a delay may 
help our subjects in a similar way to inhibit an initial impulse to respond to the last object 
manipulated.  
Based on the results of the exclusion performance tasks and the findings from the crow 
study (Mikolasch et al., 2012), we predicted that the most likely outcome of our first 
experiment would be that, similar to their performances in the exclusion performance tasks, 
the jackdaws, but not the Grey parrots, would be susceptible to the manipulation of the cups. 
Alternatively, the Grey parrots may perform similar to the carrion crows and will - 
independent of their behaviour in the exclusion performance task and like the jackdaws - 
succumb to the manipulation of the cups. For the second experiment, we predicted that the 
incorporation of a delay between cup manipulation and choice would allow the birds to 
overcome their enhancement bias.  
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Experiment 1: object manipulation 
Methods 
Subjects  
Five hand-raised jackdaws (three males, two females) at the age of two years participated in 
this experiment. All birds had participated in the exclusion performance experiment of 
Schloegl (2011), in which the majority of them showed a high susceptibility to local 
enhancement. They were housed in a 60 m2 outdoor aviary at the Konrad Lorenz Research 
Station in Grünau im Almtal, Austria. The aviary consisted of two outdoor sections and five 
smaller testing compartments, in which the subjects could be tested in visual isolation from 
the other birds. Except for testing, the birds were free to enter all sections of the aviary. The 
two outdoor compartments contained natural grass vegetation, feeding platforms, nest boxes 
and some perches. The indoor section had a gravel ground and was equipped with some 
perches. The main indoor compartment (approx. 3 x 2 m) and one of the smaller neighbouring 
compartments (approx. 1.5m x 1m) were both equipped with wooden platforms (approx. 40 x 
70 cm and 30 x 60 cm, respectively; 1.5 m above ground), on which the tests took place. Both 
platforms were adjacent to each other and connected through a wire sliding door (open during 
the entire experiment). When being tested, the bird was sitting on the test platform in the main 
compartment whereas the experimenter (E; S.M.) was standing in the neighbouring 
compartment presenting the test on the corresponding platform. The birds were fed in the 
morning and in the afternoon with various kinds of fruits, grain, milk products and vegetables. 
The jackdaws were tested in September 2009. 
Additionally, seven Grey parrots (four males, three females), with different and often 
not fully known histories and between approx. 7 and 25 years old, were tested. Previously, 
three of the birds had participated in a exclusion performance task, in which they showed no 
susceptibility to local enhancement (Schmidt et al. unpubl. data). They were all housed in an 
indoor-outdoor aviary (3 x 5 m each) at a parrot rescue centre in Vienna, Austria. The aviary 
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was enriched with several perches, platforms and toys. The birds were fed with fruits in the 
morning and seeds in the afternoon. For testing, the birds were separated in a test 
compartment (120 x 70 cm with 210 cm height) within the aviary, in which the subjects were 
visually isolated from the other birds through opaque curtains. In this compartment they could 
sit on a wooden platform (60 x 35 cm at a height of 130 cm) in front of a movable, wooden 
platform (40 x 23 cm), which was hanging from the ceiling at the same height. The test setup 
was presented on the movable platform. The Grey parrots were tested between March and 
June 2010. 
 
Training  
To ensure that the birds were aware that they have to make a choice we placed one piece of 
food (in case of the jackdaws a piece of dry cat food; for the Grey parrots a piece of walnut or 
a seed) visibly on the test platform (left/right randomized). Then two identical opaque plastic 
cups (Grey parrots: 9 cm height and 8 cm diameter; jackdaws: 7.5 cm height and 6.5 cm 
diameter) were placed simultaneously on the platform (approx. 20 cm away from each other) 
with one cup covering the reward. In the jackdaws, the bird was allowed to approach the cups 
as soon as E had removed her hands from the cups; the birds themselves turned the cups and 
retrieved the food. In the Grey parrots the movable platform was pushed forward to allow the 
bird to touch one cup with its beak, which was then lifted by E so that the bird was able to eat 
the food if choosing correctly. If a bird chose incorrectly, it was prevented from approaching 
the second cup and the remaining food item was removed in view of the bird. The cups 
remained on the board the whole time and the next trial was conducted in direct succession of 
the previous one. All birds received one session per day with 10 trials each; to reach the test 
phase they had to choose the baited cup in at least 8 trials in each of two consecutive sessions. 
 
66 
 
Testing procedure  
Two rewards were placed visibly and simultaneously on the wooden test platform and were 
covered with the two opaque cups, so that each cup was baited. Then, one of the following 
manipulations was performed, which were identical to those described in Mikolasch et 
al.(2012): 
 Show With one hand E lifted one of the cups to a height of approx. 20 cm and with the 
other hand she took the reward between her fingertips and clearly showed it to the bird. After 
this, she returned the reward back to the same position as before and covered it with the cup. 
 Take As above, with the exception that the reward was taken away and put in E’s 
pocket after having been shown to the bird. 
 Show & Take Now, both cups were lifted sequentially. The reward underneath the 
first cup was shown to the bird (identical to Show manipulation), and the reward underneath 
the second cup was lifted and put in E’s pocket (identical to Take manipulation). 
 Take & Show As above, but the two manipulations were conducted in reversed order. 
Each manipulation was performed slowly (approx. 5 sec.) and E made sure that the bird was 
attentive from the start of the manipulation and throughout the procedure, meaning that the 
bird looked at the set-up and the manipulations. The choice procedure of the cups was 
identical to the procedure in the training phase and the location (left or right) and the order of 
the manipulations were randomized. Each bird received only one session per day. In the 
jackdaws each session consisted of six trials and a total of nine sessions were given to the 
birds. Initially, we expected different responses to Take trials, Show trials and trials in which 
both presentations would be presented. However, we did not expect different responses to 
Take & Show and Show & Take trials. Thus, we designed the task originally as consisting of 
three conditions, and presented Take & Show and Show & Take trials to randomize the order 
of manipulations within one condition. However, as we found significant differences between 
the Take & Show and Show & Take trials (see below) in our initial tests with jackdaws, we 
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changed the setup for the subsequent testing of the Grey parrots. Thus, the Grey parrots 
received nine sessions consisting of eight trials and with each of the four conditions being 
presented twice. 
 
Analysis  
All tests were videotaped for behaviour coding later on. Given that in the Show condition both 
cups were baited and therefore both cups would have been correct, we scored whether the 
birds chose the manipulated cup. In all other conditions we scored if the birds chose the baited 
cup. A second observer, who was blind to the purpose of the study, coded 10% of all trials to 
calculate an inter-observer reliability using Cohen’s kappa. Both coders agreed in 100% of the 
trials (Cohen’s ĸ = 1.0).  As the data of the training phase did not meet the requirements for 
parametric testing we used a Mann-Whitney-U test to check for differences between the 
species. Test performance data (i.e. choice of the manipulated or baited cup, respectively) 
were normally distributed and we compared the performance in the different conditions and in 
the two species by running a two-way repeated measures ANOVA, using condition as within-
subject factor and species as between-subject factor. For post hoc analyses we used the Holm-
Sidak test. For each condition we tested the performance against the hypothetical chance level 
of 50% using a one-sample t-test. To see how often the birds chose the only or last 
manipulated cup compared to the not or first manipulated one, we combined the data of all 
four conditions and calculated another one-sample t-test. All tests were conducted two-tailed 
with α = .05. 
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Results 
The jackdaws needed an average of 21.7 trials (SD = 4.5; range = 20 to 30) and the Grey 
parrots an average of 30.0 trials (SD = 15.3; range = 20 to 60) to reach the training criterion, 
which is not significant different from each other, Mann-Whitney test, U(7, 5) = 27.5, p = 
.432.  
In the test phase, the jackdaws chose the manipulated cup in condition Show, t(4) = 
12.67, p < .001, and the baited cup in condition Take & Show, t(4) = 16.74, p < .001, 
significantly more often than expected by chance, whereas in condition Take they chose the 
un-baited cup significantly above chance, t(4) = -2.92, p = .043, and in condition Show & 
Take they did not prefer any cup, t(4) = -1.47, p = .216, (Figure 1). Similarly, the Grey parrots 
also preferred the manipulated or the baited cup in the conditions Show, t(6) = 10.84, p < .001, 
and Take & Show, t(6) = 16.97, p < .001; again like the jackdaws, they did not have a 
preference for any cup in condition Show & Take, t(6) = -0.81, p = .448, but in contrast to 
them, their preference for the un-baited cup in condition Take failed to reach significance, t(6) 
= -2.06, p = .085, (see supplementary Table 1 for individual performance).  
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Figure 1: Performance in percentage of correct choices in experiment 1 across all four conditions. Grey bars 
indicate the performance of the Grey parrots and white bars the performance of the jackdaws. Note that both 
cups were baited in the Show condition and we therefore plotted the choice of the manipulated cup, whereas in 
all other conditions we plotted the choice of the baited cup. Significant differences between the conditions (data 
for both species pooled) are indicated by different letters below the bars (post hoc Holm-Sidak analysis). 
Asterisks above the bars indicate a significant difference from chance level (illustrated by the horizontal line) 
according to a one-sample t-test. The box plots show the median and quartile. The whiskers represent 10% and 
90% range; dots indicate 5% and 95% range. 
 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA found a significant difference between the conditions, 
F (3,30) = 65.10, p < .001 (Figure 1, Table 1), but not between the two species, F (1,30) = 
0.016, p = .903, nor an interaction of both factors, F (3,30) = 0.65, p = .592. Post-hoc analyses 
showed that because of their preference for the manipulated cup in the Take condition, the 
birds chose the reward in condition Take less frequently than in condition Show (p < .001), 
even though in both conditions they had seen where food was available. When two 
manipulations were performed (Take & Show and Show & Take) the birds preferred the cup 
that was manipulated last, resulting in a significantly better performance in the Take & Show 
condition, in which the last action was showing the food, than in the Show & Take condition, 
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in which the food was taken away from the second cup (p < .001). As a consequence, the 
birds also obtained a reward less frequently in the condition Show & Take than in the 
condition Show (p < .001) and they were significantly better in the Take & Show than in the 
Take condition (p < .001). However, we found no significant differences between conditions 
Take and Show & Take (p = .122) and between the conditions Show and Take & Show (p = 
.989). When combining the data of all four conditions, we found that the jackdaws, t(4) = 
8.38, p = .001, as well as the Grey parrots, t(6) = 9.22, p < .001, chose the only or last 
manipulated cup significantly more often than the first or untouched cup (Figure 2). 
 
Table 1: Effect sizes and confidence interval for statistical comparisons of  
experiment 1 
  95% CI 
 Effect size r LL UL 
Show – Take 0.91 43.71 73.87 
Show – Show & Take 0.88 35.46 63.62 
Show – Take & Show 0.02 -6.34 7.27 
Take – Show & Take 0.26 -18.57 0.70 
Take – Take & Show 0.86 -70.03 -46.62 
Show & Take – Take & Show 0.83 -61.48 -36.67 
Note:  CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit 
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Figure 2: Percentage of choices for the only or last manipulated cup or the not or first manipulated cup across all 
four conditions in experiment 1 (left panel) and experiment 2 (right panel). The grey bars show the performance 
of the Grey parrots and the white bars the performance of the jackdaws. Asterisks above the bars indicate a 
significant difference from chance level (illustrated by the horizontal line) according to a one-sample t-test. The 
box plots show the median and quartile. The whiskers represent 10% and 90% range; dots indicate 5% and 95% 
range. 
 
Discussion 
Both species were highly susceptible to the manipulation of the cups, and we found no clear 
performance differences between Grey parrots and jackdaws. Moreover, our results match 
those found in carrion crows, which also preferred the manipulated cup, even if it did not 
contain any food (Mikolasch et al. 2012). In sum, even in our presumably simple 
discriminatory task, local enhancement seems to be a very potent trigger, so that the birds 
were not able to abstain from choosing the manipulated cup. Therefore, it seems as if their 
inhibitory control, which is the capability to suppress an immediate response in order to 
permit a later response (Anderson 2003), was weaker than the impulse to choose the 
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manipulated cup. Whereas such a bias was expected in the jackdaws, it is surprising to find a 
strong susceptibility in the Grey parrots.  
Whereas the preference for the manipulated cup in the conditions Show and Take can 
be explained by local enhancement alone, this is insufficient to explain the birds’ choices in 
the Take & Show and Show & Take condition, given that here both cups were manipulated. 
However, the preference for the cup that had been manipulated last is in accordance with a 
recency effect (Pineno and Miller 2005) as found in studies of list learning (Shettleworth 
2010). Here, subjects are most accurate in remembering the last item of a list if they have to 
recall the list shortly after its initial presentation. This effect, however, disappears after longer 
intervals between presentation and recall and may even turn into a primacy effect, i.e. a most 
accurate performance in remembering the first item of the list. Such effects have been found 
in humans (Cornell and Bergstrom 1983; Knoedler 1999; Wright et al. 1985), rhesus monkeys 
and pigeons (Wright et al. 1985).  
The time delay required to shift away from a recency effect differed between the 
species and ranged from ten seconds in pigeons to 30 seconds in monkeys and 100 seconds in 
humans (Wright et al. 1985). Thus, we reasoned that a time delay between the end of 
presentation and time of choice could allow the birds to overcome the recency effect and may 
even strengthen their inhibitory control to increase their choice accuracy. To test this, we 
conducted a second experiment in which the manipulations were identical to those of the first 
experiment, but we added a time delay before the birds were allowed to choose a cup. Based 
on a previous study demonstrating relatively short attention spans in jackdaws (Scheid et al. 
2007), we opted to use a ten second delay, which is the same that had been used for pigeons. 
To make the test comparable, we used the same delay for the Grey parrots. 
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Experiment 2: object manipulation with delay 
Methods 
Subjects 
Four jackdaws from experiment 1 participated. While the fifth jackdaw refused to work, two 
other individuals, which had not participated in the first task but were equally hand-raised and 
two years old, started to work in this experiment (for detailed information see supplementary 
material Table 1). Therefore, six jackdaws (three males, three females) were tested in this 
second experiment. The same seven Grey parrots from experiment 1 participated. 
 
Training  
Only the two jackdaws that had not participated in experiment 1 were trained to choose 
between the two cups; the training procedure was identical to the procedure used in 
experiment 1. 
 
Testing procedure  
The procedure and conditions were the same as in the first experiment with the exception that 
after the manipulations had been executed, E continued to touch both cups for ten seconds 
while looking straight ahead. After this delay E removed her hands and the birds were again 
allowed to choose one cup. 
 
Analysis  
The inter-observer reliability of two coders for 10% of the trials was again at 100% agreement 
(Cohen’s ĸ = 1.0). The principal analysis was identical to experiment 1. In addition and to 
compare the performances in the first and in the second experiment, we fitted a GLMM using 
the GENLINMIXED procedure in SPSS 19™. The model was constructed with the binomial 
variable choice as the response variate and identity of the subject as random term to account 
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for repeated measurements. It contained condition, species and delay as fixed terms. 
Additionally, we incorporated all possible two-way interactions and a three way species × 
condition × delay interaction. According to standard stepwise model reduction procedures, 
we sequentially deleted fixed terms in order of decreasing significance, whereby the least 
significant term was determined after each removal step (Galwey 2006; Garamszegi et al. 
2009). Deletion of fixed terms continued until only terms with a significance value below .1 
remained. This was then considered the final model. Excluded terms were re-entered one by 
one into the final model to confirm that they did not explain a significant part of the variation. 
For each factor remaining in the final model, we calculated pairwise post-hoc comparisons 
using the sequential Sidak-procedure; terms were only regarded as being significant if p < .05.  
 
Results 
Experiment 2 
The two new jackdaws both needed the minimum of two sessions (20 trials) only to reach the 
training criterion. Their test performance did not deviate from the other birds (see 
supplementary material Table 1 for individual performance data), arguing against carry-over 
or learning effects from experiment 1. Therefore, we pooled their data with those of the other 
birds for the subsequent analysis.  
As in the test phase of experiment 1, the jackdaws chose the manipulated cup in 
condition Show, t(5) = 6.33, p < .001, and the baited cup in condition Take & Show, t(5) = 
7.68, p < .001, significantly more often than expected by chance. In contrast to experiment 1, 
the jackdaws now chose the baited cup significantly above chance in condition Show & Take, 
t(5) = 2.70, p = .043, and they chose at chance level in condition Take, t(5) = 1.17, p = 0.296, 
(Figure 3). The Grey parrots showed a pattern similar to the jackdaws and were significantly 
above chance in the conditions Show, t(6) = 3.65, p = .011, Take & Show, t(6) = 4.36, p = 
.005,  and Show & Take, t(6) = 4.80, p = .003, (Figure 3), and they were at chance level in the 
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condition Take t(6) = 0.11, p = .916, (see supplementary Table 1 for individual 
performances).  
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Figure 3: Performance in percentage of correct choices in experiment 2 across all four conditions. Grey bars 
indicate the performance of the Grey parrots and white bars the performance of the jackdaws. Note that both 
cups were baited in the Show condition and we therefore plotted the choice of the manipulated cup, whereas in 
all other conditions we plotted the choice of the baited cup. Significant differences between the conditions (data 
for both species pooled) are indicated by different letters below the bars (post hoc Holm-Sidak analysis). 
Asterisks above the bars indicate a significant difference from chance level (illustrated by the horizontal line) 
according to a one-sample t-test. The box plots show the median and quartile. The whiskers represent 10% and 
90% range; dots indicate 5% and 95% range. 
 
As in experiment 1, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant differences 
between the conditions, F (3,33) = 10.17, p < .001, but now also between the two species, 
with the jackdaws outperforming the Grey parrots, F (1,33) = 5.35, p = .041 (Figure 3, Table 
2). The interaction between both factors was non-significant, F (3,33) = 1.44, p = .248. Post 
hoc analyses revealed that the birds chose the manipulated cup in condition Show 
significantly more often than the baited cup in condition Take (p < .001), but there was no 
difference compared to the conditions Show & Take (p = .083) and Take & Show (p = .182). 
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Additionally, the birds chose the baited cup significantly more often in the condition Take & 
Show than in the conditions Take (p < .001) and Show & Take (p = .003). Due to the 
adjustment for multiple testing no difference was detectable between condition Take and 
Show & Take (p = .048). When combining the data of all four conditions, we again found a 
significant preference for the only or last manipulated cup in the jackdaws, t(5) = 4.33, p < 
.007, but not in the Grey parrots, t(6) = 1.53, p = .172, (Figure 2). 
 
Table 2: Effect sizes and confidence interval for statistical comparisons of  
experiment 2 
  95% CI 
 Effect size r LL UL 
Show – Take 0.60 7.88 34.34 
Show – Show & Take 0.38 0.46 19.58 
Show – Take & Show 0.23 -17.15 3.29 
Take – Show & Take 0.41 -25.06 1.96 
Take – Take & Show 0.66 -42.06 -14.01 
Show & Take – Take & Show 0.52 -27.94 -5.05 
Note:  CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit 
 
Comparison between experiment 1 and 2 
The final model of the GLMM contained condition, species as well as a condition × delay and 
a condition × species interaction (Table 3). The post-hoc analysis for the factor condition 
revealed that no performance difference was detectable between the conditions Show and 
Take & Show (p = .092), but the birds were more successful in these conditions than in the 
conditions Take and Show & Take (all ps < .001); the lowest success rate was detectable in the 
condition Take, in which the birds were even less successful than in the condition Show & 
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Take (p = .023). The jackdaws were more successful than the Grey parrots, even though the 
factor species marginally failed to reach significance. As the post-hoc analysis of the 
condition × species interaction revealed, the superiority of the jackdaws is mainly based on 
their higher success rate in the condition Take & Show (p < .001), whereas no species 
difference could be found in any of the other conditions (all ps ≥ .403). It seems that the 
introduction of the delay did not alter the performance of the birds (non-significance of the 
factor delay), but the significant condition × delay interaction and subsequent post-hoc 
analysis show that a change in performance occurred, even though not uniformly in all 
conditions; the delay improved the performance of both species in the conditions Show & 
Take and Take (both ps < .001), but decreased the performance in the conditions Show (p < 
.001) and Take & Show (p = .001), and this decline in the condition Take & Show was 
particularly pronounced in the Grey parrots (Figure 3). Even though the delay × species 
interaction was dropped from the final model, it seems worth to mention that the introduction 
of the delay led to a drop in the overall success rate of the Grey parrots from 71% in the first 
experiment to 65% in the second experiment; in contrast, the jackdaws’ performance 
remained relatively stable (74% and 75%, respectively). 
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Table 3: Full and final model of the GLMM to illustrate the performance  
differences in experiment 1 and 2.  
 
Fixed terms df F p 
    Full model 
Delay 1 0.383 0.536 
Condition 3 58.509 < 0.001 
Species 1 2.880 0.090 
Condition × delay 3 16.032 < 0.001 
Condition × species 3 2.801 0.039 
Delay × species 1 0.913 0.340 
Condition × delay × species 3 0.006 0.999 
 
   Final model  
Condition 3 61.095 < 0.001 
Species 1 3.810 0.051 
Condition × delay 3 15.832 < 0.001 
Condition × species 3 3.597 0.013 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment we found a difference between the two species, with the jackdaws 
outperforming the Grey parrots. On the first view this is surprising given that the jackdaws are 
still biased towards choosing the last manipulated cup, whereas this bias disappeared in the 
Grey parrots. However, the jackdaws were in particular more successful than the Grey parrots 
in choosing the baited cup in the condition Take & Show, which led to the higher overall 
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Importantly, even though the jackdaws were more successful than the Grey parrots, 
this was not due to a performance increase after the introduction of the delay on side of the 
jackdaws, but to a marginal performance drop after the delay in the Grey parrots. 
Furthermore, it becomes evident that the introduction of the ten second delay led to a decrease 
of the strength of the recency effect, which is evidenced by the finding that the success rate 
increased in those conditions in which the last seen manipulation was a removal of the food 
(conditions Take and Show & Take). However, at the same time, the birds’ preference for the 
only or last manipulated cup dropped in those conditions in which the reward was only shown 
or in which showing was the last manipulation seen (condition Show and Take & Show).   
 
General discussion 
Even in our cognitively less demanding task, in which the full information about the food 
location was always available, the birds were only able to choose the baited cup reliably in 
some conditions. These findings support the results of Mikolasch et al. (2012), who found a 
similar pattern in carrion crows, and the report of Schloegl (2011), who found that jackdaws 
are highly susceptible to local enhancement. Against our prediction, we found a similar 
influence of local enhancement in African grey parrots. In previous studies, Grey parrots 
solved exclusion performance tasks without being distracted by the manipulation of the cups 
(Schmidt et al. unpubl. data; Mikolasch et al. 2011), and thus, we expected them to be more 
successful than the jackdaws in the present task. 
Additionally, we found a decline in the birds’ performance in our second experiment 
when a ten second delay was introduced, but interestingly this effect was not equally 
distributed across the conditions. While the birds were more likely to choose the not or first 
manipulated cup in the conditions Show and Take & Show, which led to a worse performance 
in the latter condition, their performances in the conditions Take and Show & Take 
significantly increased in the second experiment. Presumably, the delay strengthened the 
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birds’ inhibitory control and thereby also choice accuracy, even though the jackdaws still 
remained susceptible to local enhancement. The idea of strengthened inhibitory control 
facilitating the birds to choose the baited cup is in accordance not only with the results of the 
Take and the Show & Take condition, but also with the decreased preference for the 
manipulated cup in the Show condition after the introduction of the delay; note that in this 
particular condition, both cups were baited and a choice of the non-manipulated cup did not 
have negative consequences. Furthermore, a simultaneous increase in distraction may have 
played a role, which may also explain why the performance decreased in the Take & Show 
condition, particularly in the Grey parrots. We could observe that in contrast to the jackdaws, 
which remained focused on the cups during the delay, some of the Grey parrots apparently 
lost attention and began to manipulate the wooden platform or one of the separation curtains. 
Other birds tried to grab the correct, but still out of reach cup during the delay, but then chose 
the other cup once they were allowed to choose. This is in line with recent findings from a 
delay-of-gratification task, in which Grey parrots did not wait for up to five seconds to gain a 
larger reward (Vick et al. 2010), but opted for a smaller, immediately available reward. An 
alternative explanation for the birds’ change in performance whether for the better or for the 
worse, would be a weakened memory of the last action produced by the experimenter. This 
may either be due to the delay itself or due to the touching of both cups by the experimenter 
during the delay. However, to achieve their increased success in the Take and Show & Take 
conditions, the birds had to rely on the information they obtained during the manipulations 
(i.e. the removal of the food). Thus, to apply the argument of a weakened memory, one needs 
to assume that the birds remembered where the food remained and where not, but forgot the 
order in which the experimenter’s actions occurred. Taken together and given that Grey 
parrots possess advanced cognitive abilities (Pepperberg 1999, 2006; Mikolasch et al. 2011) 
and reach stage 5 – object permanence (Pepperberg et al. 1997), it seems unlikely that their 
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relatively weak performance in experiment 2 was based on an incapability to solve the task, 
but rather on decreasing interest or attention due to the delay. 
Interestingly, the influence of local enhancement on the Grey parrots was more 
pronounced in this presumably cognitively less demanding task than in the previous exclusion 
performance tests (Schmidt et al. unpubl. data). The main difference between the tasks is the 
visibility of the food during the cup-manipulation. In the exclusion performance test, the food 
was hidden out of sight and the birds had not seen the food at all (when confronted with an 
empty cup) or had seen it only once before they made their choice. Here, however, they saw 
the food twice in each condition (during hiding and at the second presentation). From an 
associative point of view, it may be more difficult to inhibit the choice of a pilfered cup than 
to inhibit the choice of a cup that had always been empty. This is because the pilfered cup had 
been associated with food before, whereas no such association had been formed for the empty 
cup. For instance, Russell and Thompson (2003) found that 14-17 month old children, who 
witnessed two toys being placed in two boxes, were more likely to choose the box where an 
experimenter removed the toy afterwards, instead of the box that still contained a toy. 
Additionally, this preference weakened over time, as their performance was significantly 
better when they were asked to find the toy after 24 hours. The authors argued that this may 
be due to an associative strategy, in which the child associated the box from which the toy 
was removed with the availability of toys.  
Taken all these findings together, we suggest that both species, jackdaws and Grey 
parrots, were highly susceptible to the manipulation of the cups. Similar to carrion crows 
(Mikolasch et al. 2012), they chose the cup that had been manipulated last, even if the food 
had been removed from there. In contrast to the exclusion performance tasks, which were 
solved successfully only by the Grey parrots and not by the jackdaws (Schmidt et al. unpubl. 
data; Schloegl 2011), we found only minor differences between both species in our object 
manipulation task. However, we found that jackdaws performed better than the Grey parrots 
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when they had to wait for ten seconds before choosing one cup, which is mostly due to their 
better performance in the condition Take & Show. Based on our observations of the Grey 
parrots’ behaviour during the delay (see above), we think that this difference is mainly 
attributable to a decrease in interest or attention of the Grey parrots. 
From a comparative point of view, it is interesting to note that the carrion crows 
(Mikolasch et al. 2012) and the Grey parrots both succumbed to local enhancement in the 
object manipulation task, whereas only the carrion crows were similarly distracted by such 
cues in the exclusion performance task (Mikolasch et al. 2012; Schmidt et al. unpubl. data). 
Thus, in the exclusion performance task, bottom-up processes influenced the choices of Grey 
parrots and carrion crows differently. In consequence, low-level, bottom-up interferences may 
have a larger impact on cognitive tests than previously considered. 
In summary, our study provides evidence for strong and unexpected effects of presumably 
cognitively simple mechanisms on test performance even in large-brained, cognitively 
advanced species and highlights the importance of considering low-level mechanisms during 
experimental planning and analysis. Being attentive to this, negative results in cognitive tasks, 
that are not due to an incapability of a species but to its enhancement to local stimuli, may be 
avoided. 
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Supplementary material: 
 
Table 1: Individual performances in percentage of correct choices in experiment 1 and 2 of jackdaws and Grey 
parrots (j = jackdaw; gp = Grey parrot; m = male; f = female).  
Individual Species Sex 
Show Take Show & Take Take & Show 
Exp.1 Exp.2 Exp.1 Exp.2 Exp.1 Exp.2 Exp.1 Exp.2 
Hollo j f 100.0 80.0 27.8 60.0 55.6 80.0 100.0 100.0 
Leechmilk j m 83.3 80.0 27.8 50.0 33.3 70.0 100.0 70.0 
Collins j m 88.9 60.0 50.0 70.0 33.3 70.0 100.0 100.0 
Bengi j m 88.9 80.0 38.9 40.0 55.6 50.0 88.9 100.0 
Udo j f 100.0 - 11.1 - 11.1 - 88.9 - 
Ahab j f - 70.0 - 60.0 - 50.0 - 80.0 
Nincs j f - 90.0 - 50.0 - 60.0 - 100.0 
Awisa gp f 100.0 66.7 16.7 44.4 44.4 72.2 83.3 66.7 
Kasi gp f 100.0 77.8 0.0 16.7 22.2 77.8 94.4 88.9 
Rocky gp m 77.8 50.0 38.9 61.1 66.7 55.6 77.8 77.8 
Leo gp m 88.9 94.4 38.9 72.2 38.9 55.6 88.9 77.8 
Cocohan gp m 94.4 72.2 33.3 38.9 33.3 61.1 88.9 61.1 
Moritz gp m 77.8 55.6 61.1 66.7 61.1 66.7 94.4 50.0 
Maja gp f 100.0 83.3 50.0 55.6 50.0 66.7 88.9 77.8 
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Abstract 
Exclusion allows the detection of hidden food when confronted with the choice between an 
empty and a potentially baited food location. However, exclusion may be based on avoidance 
of the empty location without drawing inferences about the presence of the food in the baited 
location. So far, such inferences have been demonstrated in the Great Apes only: after seeing 
an experimenter eating one of two food types, which both had been hidden previously in two 
boxes, the apes were able to choose the box that still contained the other food type. African 
grey parrots are capable of exclusion, and we here assessed if they are capable of inference by 
exclusion. In our task, two different but equally preferred food items were hidden in full view 
of the bird under two opaque cups. Then, an experimenter secretly removed one food type and 
showed it to the bird. Similarly to the apes, one out of seven parrots significantly preferred the 
baited cup; control conditions rule out that its choice was based on associative learning or the 
use of olfactory cues. Thus, we conclude that – like the apes – some grey parrots are able to 
infer the location of a hidden food reward. 
 
Keywords 
African grey parrots, inference by exclusion, reasoning
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Introduction 
Choice by exclusion is defined as “the ability to base the choice of a target on the rejection of 
potential alternatives” (Schloegl 2011); for instance, apes (Call 2004), monkeys (Hill et al. 
2011; Sabbatini and Visalberghi 2008; Schmitt and Fischer 2009; Petit et al. 2005), dogs 
(Aust et al. 2008; Bräuer et al. 2006; Erdöhegyi et al. 2007) and ravens (Schloegl et al. 2009) 
selected the baited box in a two-choice procedure with two opaque boxes after they received 
information about the empty box only. However, this task can be solved by an avoidance of 
the empty box rather than an inference about the reward in the baited box. Only in a 
chimpanzee study by Premack and Premack (1994) was it possible to rule out avoidance of 
the incorrect alternative. First, the experimenter hid an apple and a banana in two different 
boxes in full view of the ape; subsequently the chimpanzee was allowed to witness the 
experimenter eating one of the fruits, which had been removed secretly, and was thereupon 
allowed to choose one box. Only one out of five individuals was reliably able to choose the 
still-baited box. This task was then replicated with all great ape species by Call (2006), who 
found a similar degree of inter-individual differences. Thus, in general, great apes are able to 
draw inferences by exclusion, but it seems to be a demanding, not easy-to-solve task.   
Nothing is known about “true” inferential reasoning in such a food-finding task beyond the 
great apes, as it has never been replicated with a non-ape species. Recent data indicate that 
African grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus), who are well-known for their advanced cognitive 
abilities (Pepperberg 1999), are able to choose by exclusion in the visible as well as in the 
acoustic domain (Schmidt et al.). Therefore, we here tested whether African grey parrots are 
capable of ape-like true inferential reasoning, which will be important for our understanding 
of the cognitive evolution of mammals and birds.  
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Material and methods 
The subjects were seven grey parrots (four males), housed in a parrot rescue centre in Vienna, 
Austria. The birds were of different and often not fully known history and were between 
approx. 7 and 25 years old. They were housed together with other not tested individuals in an 
indoor – outdoor aviary (3 m x 5 m each) that was enriched with several perches and toys. 
Birds were fed with fruits in the morning and seeds in the evening. Testing was conducted 
between 9:00 and 13:00 h and each bird was tested in visual isolation (testing compartment: 
120 cm x 70 cm and 210 cm height) on a fixed platform (60 cm x 35 cm at a height of 130 
cm). The experimental setup consisted of two identical opaque cups (9 cm height and 8 cm 
diameter) on a wooden, movable platform (40 cm x 23 cm) hanging from the ceiling at the 
same height but 15 cm away from the fixed platform (see Figure S1 in supplementary 
material). Therefore, while the birds were positioned on the fixed platform, the experimenter 
could present the setup out of their reach on the movable platform and could push it within 
their reach to allow them to choose.  
 
Pre-tests 
Choice training 
This test was introduced to ensure that the birds were aware that they would have to make a 
choice. One piece of food (e.g. a seed or a piece of walnut, depending on known preferences 
of the birds) was placed on the movable platform and covered with an opaque cup. 
Simultaneously, the second cup was placed on the same platform at a distance of approx. 20 
cm. Then, the platform was pushed forward to allow the bird to make a choice by touching a 
cup with its beak and retrieve a food item if correct. One session consisted of ten trials; the 
training criterion to reach the next step was set to be correct on at least eight trials in two 
consecutive sessions. 
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Preference test 
This test was introduced to ensure that the test performance would not be influenced by food 
preferences. We visibly placed two different food items (the same as in the training) 
simultaneously on the movable platform and covered them with the two cups. Then, the bird 
was allowed to choose and retrieve one food item. The position of the food types was semi-
randomized with the stipulation that the same food type was not placed on the same side for 
more than three consecutive trials. Two sessions were conducted, each consisting of ten trials. 
Birds were advanced to the test if they did not show a preference for one food type, i.e. did 
not select one item more than 13 times over the two sessions.  
 
Tests  
In the test phase these two equally preferred food items were then placed simultaneously on 
the movable platform and covered with the two cups:  
 
Visible condition 
Standing equidistantly between the cups and in full view of the subjects, the experimenter 
looked straight ahead, lifted the left cup, manipulated the food, returned the cup, lifted the 
right cup, manipulated the food and returned the cup. One manipulation consisted of taking 
the food, showing it to the bird and putting it back on the board. The other manipulation 
consisted of taking the food, showing it to the bird and removing it. The order of 
manipulations was randomized, but no food type was removed more than three times in a row 
and no side remained baited in more than three consecutive trials. Afterwards the bird was 
allowed to make a choice and received the reward if correct or saw the empty cup if not. 
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Invisible condition 
This condition was identical to the visible condition, with the exception that after covering the 
rewards with the cups an opaque barrier was placed between the bird and the cups and the two 
manipulations were performed behind this barrier. Then, the barrier was removed and the 
experimenter showed the item she had taken away and put it into her pocket. The birds first 
received either the visible or the invisible condition. If the birds showed a significant 
preference for the baited cup in the invisible condition, two control conditions were 
conducted.  
 
Olfaction control 
Behind the barrier, the experimenter hid one piece of food (per trial one of the two food types) 
underneath one of the cups. Without any information about the food location the bird was 
then allowed to choose one cup.   
 
Association control 
To test if the birds used the associative rule “always choose the cup with the food type not 
having been shown” we visibly placed the two food items on the board, covered them with 
the cups and then took – in full view of the subject - one piece of food (of the same type as 
one of the food items being hidden) out of the experimenters’ pocket, showed it to the bird 
and put it back in the pocket. Afterwards the bird was allowed to choose. In all conditions, the 
birds received three sessions with ten trials per session for a total of thirty trials in each 
condition. Birds received only one session per day. If a bird left the testing area during 
testing, the session was continued on the following day (see supplementary material). 
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Results 
The parrots received 22.9 ± 4.9 ( SDx ± , range 20-30) trials of choice training. In the 
preference test, no bird chose one food type more than 12 times (Binomial-tests: P ≥ 0.503). 
In the test, the birds significantly preferred the baited cup in the visible (One-Sample t-test: N 
= 7, df = 6, t = 7.772, P < 0.001), but not in the invisible condition (t = 1.430, P = 0.203; 
Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Percentage of correct choices in the visible and invisible condition. The horizontal line indicates the 
chance level. The box plot shows median and quartiles. The whiskers represent 10% and 90% range, dots 
indicates 5% and 95% range. 
 
On an individual level, all birds selected the baited cup in the majority of the trials in the 
visible condition and three birds were significantly above chance level (P ≤ 0.043; Table 1 
and supplementary results). In the invisible condition one out of seven birds was significantly 
above chance (Binomial-test: P = 0.005; all others: P ≥ 0.200; Table 1). The successful bird (a 
female of approx. 13 years) chose at chance level in the olfaction and in the association 
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control (Binomial-test: P = 0.856 in both cases). When comparing her performance in the first 
and last fifteen trials, we found no difference in the visible condition (McNemar-Test: N = 15, 
P > 0.999) or in the olfaction (P = 0.625) and association control (P = 0.508), but a significant 
improvement in the invisible condition (P = 0.016). 
 
Table 1: Individual performances given as percentage of correct choices. Significant performances (according to 
a Binomial-test) are highlighted in bold (f = female; m = male). 
individual sex visible invisible olfaction association 
Awisa f 70.0 76.7 46.7 56.7 
Cocohan m 63.3 50.0 - - 
Kasi f 63.3 60.0 - - 
Leo m 60.0 53.3 - - 
Maja f 76.7 46.7 - - 
Moritz m 73.3 63.3 - - 
Rocky m 66.7 43.3 - - 
 
Discussion 
Our study shows that African grey parrots can use partial information about the removed food 
item not only to choose by exclusion based on avoidance, but that they are capable of true 
inferential reasoning. However, whereas several subjects solved the task when they could see 
the experimenter’s actions, only one individual was able to solve the task when it had to infer 
the outcome of the experimenter’s actions; still, these findings are in line with the inter-
individual differences found in the great apes (Call 2004; Premack and Premack 1994). The 
birds were clearly motivated to obtain the reward, even though side biases occurred (see 
supplementary data). As they were highly attentive and never refrained from making a choice, 
we are confident that the success of only a single bird in the invisible condition is not due to 
motivational issues; rather, it supports the assumption that these inference tasks are not trivial 
but cognitively demanding. Again, this result demonstrates substantial inter-individual 
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differences in grey parrot cognitive performance (Pepperberg 2007) and that the level of 
performance depends on subtle differences between tasks (Pepperberg 1999; Giret et al. 
2010). 
Importantly, the successful bird significantly improved her performance only within 
the invisible condition. This improvement does not necessarily point to associative learning, 
as the bird performed at chance level in the association control. We suggest that the 
improvement is due to the fact that the bird did not comprehend the relevance of the food 
presentation in the beginning of the test. This is plausible in particular because this bird was 
first tested in the invisible condition. Probably, the bird needed a few trials to become 
acquainted with the test. Thus, we suggest that this bird’s performance was not based on 
learning instead of reasoning, but rather that the bird learned to reason about the 
experimenter’s action to solve the task. 
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Supplementary material: 
 
 
Figure S1: Test-set-up 
 
Material and methods 
Subjects  
Three of the birds (Awisa, Kasi and Leo) had participated previously in a visible and acoustic 
exclusion task, in which only indirect information about the location of a food reward was 
provided.  
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted between September 8th, 2010 and December 9th, 2010 and the 
birds were tested five days a week (from Monday to Friday), but not each bird participated on 
each day.  
During testing, the birds were free to leave the experimental area at any time. If a bird did so, 
the session was terminated and continued on a following day. However, this occurred only in 
two sessions with two birds.  
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During testing, the birds first received either the visible or the invisible condition first, and the 
other condition second. The order in which each bird received these conditions is shown in 
Table S1. The control conditions were conducted last.  
 
Table S1: Order of test conditions for each subject 
individual first condition second condition 
Awisa invisible visible 
Cocohan invisible visible 
Kasi invisible visible 
Leo visible invisible 
Maja visible invisible 
Moritz invisible visible 
Rocky visible invisible 
 
Results 
The performance of the birds in the visible and the invisible condition cannot be explained by 
a newly developed preference for any of the two food types as none of the birds chose one of 
the two food types significantly above chance (Table S2). However, two of the seven birds 
showed a significant side bias in the visible condition and four of the seven birds showed a 
significant bias in the invisible condition (Table S3).  
 
Table S2: Preference for one of the two food types in the two test conditions in percentage. 
individual visible condition invisible condition 
Awisa 60,0 46,7 
Cocohan 53,3 50,0 
Kasi 60,0 50,0 
Leo 56,7 63,3 
Maja 46,7 53,3 
Moritz 46,7 50,0 
Rocky 63,3 60,0 
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Table S3: Percentage of trials each bird chose the left cup (from the experimenters’ point of view) in the two test 
conditions. Significant biases (according to a Binomial-test) are highlighted in bold. 
individual visible condition invisible condition 
Awisa 40,0 66,7 
Cocohan 40,0 6,7 
Kasi 80,0 83,3 
Leo 90,0 56,7 
Maja 60,0 90,0 
Moritz 50,0 73,3 
Rocky 56,7 46,7 
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Abstract 
Transitive inference (TI) refers to the cognitive ability to derive a hierarchical relationship 
between items that have never been presented together before. TI could be a useful tool for 
individuals living in large social groups, as these are confronted with an increasing number of 
possible dyadic relationships between group members. Through TI, one could potentially 
infer rank relationships between group members and thereby avoid costly direct agonistic 
interactions. Jackdaws seem ideal candidates to test for the ability of TI as they live in 
relatively complex groups, in which such skills could be useful. We presently report the 
results of jackdaws in a touch screen experiment. Three individuals were trained to memorise 
an hierarchically ordered sequence of five differently coloured squares (A-E), which were 
presented in four pairs consisting of two adjacent colours each (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E). After 
reaching the pre-defined criteria in each single colour pair in a time comparable to other 
species, they were confronted with an unknown pair of two non-adjacent colours (e.g. B/D). 
The birds were able to infer the relationship according to the previously learnt hierarchical 
order by preferring B over D.  
 
 
Keywords 
corvids; hierarchy; jackdaws; touch screen; transitive inference 
 
 
 
 
 
* This abstract has been used for the application of various scientific conferences and might be published in the 
internet and/or the abstract book of the respective
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Introduction 
Transitive inference (TI) refers to the ability to derive a hierarchical relationship between 
items that have never been presented together before (Lazareva and Wasserman 2006). For 
instance, after learning that A is faster than B and B is faster than C, transitivity would be 
demonstrated by inferring that A is faster than C. This ability was regarded as a hallmark of 
human cognition (Vasconcelos 2008), and had been suggested to be based on logical 
deductions (i.e. reasoning); furthermore it had been argued that language may be a necessary 
requirement for TI. This changed when Bryant and Trabasso (1971) discovered that children 
under the age of seven are capable of TI in a non-verbal test, whereas previous results of 
verbal tests had indicated that TI develops at around the age of seven (Riley and Trabasso 
1974). This suggests that language does not seem to be a necessary requirement for TI. This 
view was supported when McGonigle and Chalmers (1977) first showed TI in a non-human 
animals, the squirrel monkeys Saimiri sciureus. Further studies indicated that TI may be 
based on simpler mechanisms than logical reasoning (e.g. associative strength models, for a 
review see: Vasconcelos 2008). Today, two generally different types of models are used to 
explain TI. Relational models postulate that subjects form a spatial array in which each item 
has his own ordinal position (D'Amato 1991) and TI is based on a comparison of the positions 
of the stimuli. In contrast, associative models postulate that TI is based on a comparison of the 
associative strengths of each of the two stimuli to be compared (Terrace and McGonigle 
1994; Wynne 1995). These associative strengths are acquired when learning the hierarchy.  
In non-verbal testing procedures, subjects are usually trained to a set of at least four 
simultaneous discriminations presented as follows: A>B, B>C, C>D and D>E, where X>Y 
means that when both stimuli appear together X is rewarded while Y is not. After having 
learned the different pairs, even when presented in mixed order, subjects are given a choice 
between a novel pair B/D, which is then labelled as TI pair (Shettleworth 2010). Since the 
inaugural study on squirrel monkeys, various other socially living species, such as rhesus 
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monkeys Macaca mulatta (Treichler and Van Tilburg 1996), chimpanzees Pan troglodytes 
(Gillan 1981), ring-tailed lemurs Lemur catta, mongoose lemurs Eulemur mongoz (Maclean, 
Merritt, and Brannon 2008), rats Rattus norvegicus (Davis 1992; Roberts and Phelps 1994), 
pigeons Columba livia (Lazareva and Wasserman 2006; Steirn, Weaver, and Zentall 1995; 
von Fersen, Wynne, and Delius 1991; Wynne 1997; Zorina, Kalinina, and Markina 1996), 
hooded crows Corvus cornix (Lazareva et al. 2004; Zorina, Kalinina, and Markina 1996), 
pinyon jays Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus (Bond, Kamil, and Balda 2003; Bond, Wei, and 
Kamil 2010; Paz-y-Mino et al. 2004), western scrub jays Aphelocoma californica (Bond, 
Kamil, and Balda 2003; Bond, Wei, and Kamil 2010), Clark’s nutcrackers Nucifraga 
columbiana, azure-winged magpies Cyanopica cyanus (Bond, Wei, and Kamil 2010), greylag 
geese Anser anser (Weiß, Kehmeier, and Schloegl 2010), domestic chick Gallus gallus 
(Daisley, Vallortigara, and Regolin 2010) and cichlid fish Astatotilapia burtoni (Grosenick, 
Clement, and Fernald 2007) were shown to be able of TI. However, whereas a large number 
of species is actually capable of TI, there are differences in how fast they learn a linear 
hierarchy and how complex (i.e. how many items it contains) the hierarchy may be (for a 
review see Vasconcelos 2008). 
TI may be a crucial cognitive tool for socially living species. This idea is expressed in 
the “social complexity hypothesis”, which predicts that living in large, social groups favours 
the evolution of cognitive abilities (de Waal and Tyack 2003; Jolly 1966; Balda and Kamil 
1989). Animals that live in such societies are faced with a variety of information about others 
(e.g. about age, reproductive status, dominance rank), which may change over time and needs 
frequent updates. For determining one’s own place in a social network, an individual can 
directly interact with all other members of the group or just observe interactions among others 
and draw conclusions from this and its own experience with a few of these individuals, 
allowing to infer ones’ own position to others instead of being forced to explore it repeatedly. 
This may be achieved through TI (Seyfarth and Cheney 2003; Bond, Kamil, and Balda 2003). 
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Paz-y-Mino and co-workers (2004) showed that pinyon jays use TI to predict their social rank 
in relation to opponents after having observed interactions between these individuals only. 
Similarly, cichlid fish are able to learn the rank of five neighbour fish (A-E) by only 
observing encounters between them (Grosenick, Clement, and Fernald 2007). Due to the 
proposed linkage between TI and sociality, Bond and colleagues (2003) compared pinyon 
jays, which are highly social, with relatively non-social western scrub jays. Although both 
species showed the capability of TI, the pinyon jays learned dyadic relationships more rapidly 
and more accurately and showed a more robust mechanism of TI than the scrub jays. 
Similarly, Maclean and colleagues (2008) found that highly social ring-tailed lemurs 
outperformed the less social mongoose lemurs in TI tasks. 
The jackdaw Corvus monedula is one of the most social corvid species, which lives in 
colonies throughout their whole life and establish long-term pair bonds (Röell 1978; 
Henderson, Hart, and Burke 2000). However, flock size varies seasonally and is mostly 
dependent on food availability and quality (Röell 1978). Therefore, jackdaws live within a 
dynamic fission-fusion social system, where individuals may leave or join a group. Thus, TI 
should be of high value for jackdaws, making them ideal candidates for such tests.  
To do so, we decided to use a computerized touch screen procedure and trained the 
birds to a hierarchical sequence of five differently coloured stimuli (A-E), similar to the 
training procedure used by Lazareva and Wasserman (2006). As test pair we used B/D, 
because this is the only pair of non-adjacent stimuli in which both stimuli have been equally 
rewarded and not rewarded during training. Using pairs involving the first and last item in the 
series (e.g. A and E in the current example) would not be informative about TI, as these 
stimuli have always or never been rewarded during training and therefore could easily be 
solved by the total number of responses ("end-anchor effect" Bryant and Trabasso 1971). 
Based on the knowledge about TI in other non-human animals and the fact that it seems to be 
linked to sociality, we would expect the jackdaws, which are known as highly social, to 
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master this task and to be able to transitively infer the relationship between the two stimuli 
according to their position in the previously learned order.  Additionally, we expect the 
jackdaws to learn the hierarchical list in a comparable time to other socially living species that 
were tested under similar training conditions. 
 
Methods 
Subjects 
Three hand-raised, female jackdaws (named Bruce, Udo and Pronto) participated in this 
experiment. At the beginning of testing, the birds were between one and two years old and 
lived together with 15 other jackdaws at the Konrad Lorenz Research Station in Grünau im 
Almtal, Austria. Originally, ten jackdaws took part in the experiment, but seven of them 
stopped to participate during the course of the study. All jackdaws were housed in a 60 m2 
outdoor aviary consisting of two outdoor sections and five smaller indoor compartments, 
which could be isolated visually from the other parts. The outdoor parts had natural grass 
vegetation, nest boxes, feeding platforms and perches, whereas the indoor sections had gravel 
stones on the ground and some perches. In the main indoor compartment (approx. 3 x 2 m) 
the computer (Schneider A4F® minicomputer) was located and hidden behind a wall so that 
only the screen (15” infrared touch monitor: 30.5 x 23 cm) was accessible for the birds. They 
could sit on a perch (54 cm long at a height of 30 cm) in a distance of approximately 10 cm to 
the touch screen; dried cat food was used as rewards, which were gained from a small bowl 
situated below the screen, between the perch and the screen so that the birds had to lower their 
heads to reach the reward. 
Each bird received one session per day which lasted between approximately three and 
15 minutes depending on the bird’s motivation. Birds were tested in the morning before they 
were fed with various kinds of fruits, grain, milk products and vegetables. Water was 
available ad libitum. The experiment was conducted between September 2008 and October 
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2010. For logistical reasons, the three test birds and three not tested birds were relocated to a 
new aviary (3 m x 5 m) at the University of Vienna, Austria in October 2009. The other 
jackdaws were released to the wild. Test conditions in the new aviary, including the computer 
box and touch screen, were comparable to the setup in Grünau. Testing in Vienna was 
resumed four months after the relocation and full habituation to the new environment.  
 
Procedure 
Initially, the birds were trained in groups of several individuals to approach the touch screen 
and peck once at the correct position on the screen to gain a food reward. When a bird was 
reliably pecking on the screen, further training and testing procedures took place in visual 
isolation from the other individuals: after an individual was separated in the main indoor 
compartment, the experimenter (E; S.M.) started the program at the computer and moved 
back to the rearmost corner of the compartment to allow the test subject to approach the touch 
screen. The bird was free to stop working on the touch screen at any time and to roam freely 
in the compartment. When the bird did not touch the screen for five minutes the session was 
terminated, the bird was released to the others and a new session was started the next day. 
When a bird had finished its session the screen turned black and the bird was also released to 
the group. In the beginning of the experiment, a session consisted of 32 trials. During the 
breeding seasons in 2009 and 2010, the birds lost their motivation nearly completely and 
testing was paused for a few weeks. After the breeding season 2009, we started with sessions 
of only eight trials to avoid over-taxing the birds, but already after two weeks we increased 
the number to 16 trials. As this number of trials seems to be optimal for the jackdaws we kept 
this session length until the end of testing.  
For the analysis, we always plotted 16 trials as a block, independent of the number of 
trials within a session, to analyse whether the birds reached the predefined criteria (see 
below). When a session was terminated by the bird within the first few trials, we assumed that 
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the birds are not motivated and the scores were discarded; performance data was included in 
the analysis only if at least eight trials had been completed. 
 
Training 
In the training phase the birds were trained to a hierarchical sequence of five different 
coloured squares (A-E) (for a comparable testing procedure, see Lazareva & Wasserman 
2006). For this purpose, two squares (each 6 cm x 6 cm) were presented simultaneously as a 
pair (e.g. A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E) on the screen. One square was located on the left side of the 
screen (from the left lower corner: 10 cm to the right and 11 cm to the upper edge) and the 
other one on the right side (from the left lower corner: 20 cm to the right and 11 cm to the 
upper edge) of the screen so that the two squares were 6 cm apart. As colours we chose blue 
(RGB:0;0;255), red (RGB:255;0;0), green (RGB:0;255;0), cyan (RGB:0;255;255), magenta 
(RGB:255;0;255), yellow (RGB:255;255;0) and grey (RGB:165;165;165) to have a maximal 
discrimination for the human eye. To avoid an influence of the sequence of colours, we 
assigned a unique colour sequence to each individual. The training was separated into four 
different phases. In the first phase the individuals were confronted with the first pair (A/B) 
only. Pecking A would be rewarded automatically and after an inter trial interval (ITI) of 
three seconds the next trial begun. When the incorrect stimulus B was pecked the screen 
turned black, and the bird had to wait for three seconds before a correction trial begun. The 
correction trials were repeated as long as the bird continued to peck the wrong stimulus. 
When it pecked the correct one, the bird was again rewarded and the next trial begun. In July 
2009 the ITI for incorrect trials was extended to six seconds and an acoustic feedback was 
introduced in order to alleviate the training. The location of the correct stimulus (left / right) 
was randomized. Only in a correction trial the stimuli were presented on the same side until 
the bird chose correct. The bird had to be correct in at least 13/16 trials without requiring a 
correction trial over four consecutive blocks to ensure that the bird reliably pecked the correct 
111 
 
stimulus. Then the bird was transferred to the next phase in which two pairs (A/B; B/C) were 
then presented equally often and in a randomized order, with no pair being presented more 
than three times in a row. This randomization was also adopted in the following phases. In the 
second phase, the bird had to learn that stimulus B, which was incorrect when presented 
together with A, was correct when presented together with C. Again the criterion to reach the 
next training step was to be correct in 13/16 trials over four consecutive blocks with the 
addition that the birds needed to be correct in 13/16 trials within each pair over the last two 
blocks, to ensure that not all errors occurred in only one pair. In the third phase the third pair 
was added, so that a block consisted of pairs of A/B, B/C and C/D. Criteria to reach the next 
phase remained the same as in phase two. In the last phase, the fourth pair was added and the 
birds were confronted with four different pairs (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E) within each block. 
Again, the choice accuracy criterion was set to 13/16 across four consecutive blocks and 
13/16 within each single colour pair across the blocks. 
 
Correction training 
As new pairs were not trained separately but were added to the already trained repertoire, we 
introduced correction training (CT) from the second phase onwards to simplify learning. A 
bird was given CT when its choice accuracy in one block of the training was less than 50% 
correct within a pair. A block of CT consisted of 16 trials; in phase II and III, 75% (12 trials) 
of the trials presented the low-performance pair; in phase IV, 81.25% (13 trials) consisted of 
this pair. The remaining 25% (4 trials) in phase II and III and 18.75% (3 trials) in phase IV 
presented the other pairs. From phase III on, the not over-represented pairs were equally often 
presented in one block. A bird returned to the normal training procedure when its 
performance in the low-performance pair was at least 80% correct across two consecutive 
blocks (phase II and III: 19/24; phase IV: 21/26). The CT was not considered for reaching the 
criteria to advance to the next phase. 
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Pre-test 
When the birds mastered the criterion of training phase IV they were advanced to the pre-test 
phase. This phase was conducted to acquaint the birds with unrewarded trials, which became 
necessary in the test (see below), and avoid a drop in performance. Therefore, the birds 
received blocks of 16 trials in which four trials, one of each colour pair, were not rewarded 
when pecking correctly. The required choice accuracy to advance to the test was set to 75% 
(12/16) correct over five consecutive blocks. Additionally, the birds needed to be correct in 
15/20 trials (75%) within each single colour pair across the last five blocks. When not 
reaching these criteria, the birds received further pre-testing. 
 
Test 
After passing the criteria of the pre-test the birds were advanced to the test phase. Here, the 
birds received eight blocks of 16 trials, which consisted of 14 training trials and two test trials. 
Training trials consisted of the four training pairs (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E), which were equally 
distributed across the eight test blocks. Randomization and feedback was the same as in the 
training. The two test trials consisted of the test pair (B/D) and were presented with at least 
four and at most ten training pairs in between. In contrast to the training trials the test trials 
were unrewarded regardless of the birds’ choice. There was neither a positive nor a negative 
feedback for those trials. 
 
Analysis 
On an individual level, we first tested for differences between the different training phases by 
using chi square tests; for each colour pair, we used Binomial tests to test for deviations from 
chance level. As the data were normally distributed, we used one-sample t-tests to test if the 
birds as a group deviated in their performance from chance. To assess if the birds’ 
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performance changed during testing, we ran a Pearson correlation. To evaluate the relative 
associative strength of the stimuli B and D we calculated the reward/non-reward ratio Rx by 
dividing the number of trials a stimulus was rewarded (Nr) through the number of trials a 
stimulus was non-rewarded (Nn), including all correction trials, correction training and the 
pre-test (Lazareva and Wasserman 2006). All tests were conducted two-tailed and alpha was 
set to 0.05. Data analysis was conducted using Sigma Plot 11.0. 
 
Results 
Training 
The birds needed a mean of 7.33 ± 2.52 training blocks ( SDx ± , range 5-10) to reach the 
criterion in phase I, 20.33 ± 6.35 blocks ( SDx ± , range 13-24) in phase II, 61.67 ± 51.87 
blocks ( SDx ± , range 18-119) in phase III and 56.00 ± 28.58 blocks ( SDx ± , range 39-89) 
in phase IV. A Chi-square test revealed a significant difference between the four phases for 
each individual (Bruce: χ2 = 148.792, df = 3, P < 0.001; Udo: χ2 = 113.977, df = 3, P < 0.001; 
Pronto: χ2 = 25.562, df = 3, P < 0.001, Fig. 1). There was no consistent pattern in the number 
of blocks the three birds needed to reach the criterion in the different phases. All three birds at 
least tended to learn the second pair slower than the first pair (χ2 tests: P ≤ 0.059). In phase III 
Bruce and Udo needed significantly longer than in phase II to reach the criterion (χ2 tests: P ≤ 
0.001), while there was no difference for Pronto between the two phases (χ2 test: P = 0.355). 
In phase IV finally, it was Udo and Pronto, which needed significantly more blocks than in 
phase III to reach the criterion (χ2 tests: P ≤ 0.004), whereas Bruce needed significantly less 
blocks in phase IV than in phase III (χ2
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Figure 1: The number of blocks needed per bird to reach criterion in each training phase. 
 
Correction training 
Within phase II only Pronto needed a correction training of seven blocks, while in phase III 
all three birds received a CT (Bruce: 14 blocks; Udo: 35 blocks; Pronto: 31 blocks). In phase 
IV again Udo and Pronto needed additional training of the new pair (Udo: 15 blocks; Pronto: 
7 blocks). 
 
Pre-test 
All three jackdaws needed only the minimum of five blocks to reach the criterion for the pre-
test phase. Within each block and in each colour pair across all blocks they were correct in at 
least 75% of the trials (range: blocks: 12-16 trials (out of 16); colour pairs: 15-19 trials (out of 
20)). 
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Test 
All three birds chose colour B significantly more often than colour D in the test phase 
(Binomial test: Bruce: P < 0.021; Udo: P < 0.004; Pronto: P < 0.001, Fig. 2) so that the birds’ 
choice within the TI pair differed significantly from chance (one-sample t-test: t = 7.201, df = 
2, P = 0.019). Pronto was correct on all 16 test trials, while Bruce made an error each in block 
1, 2 and 7, and Udo made an error each in block 6 and 8. In the non-transitive pairs, the birds 
were significantly above chance in the end-anchor training pairs across all eight test blocks 
(one-sample t-test: A/B: t = 12.873, df = 2, P = 0.006; D/E: t = 7.133, df = 2, P = 0.019) while 
they performed at chance level in the middle training pairs (one-sample t-test: B/C: t = 1.893, 
df = 2, P = 0.199; C/D: t = 3.047, df = 2, P = 0.093, Fig.2). The deterioration in pair B/C is 
due to the fact that Bruce and Udo did not perform significantly above chance level (Binomial 
test: both: P ≥ 0.185, Pronto: P < 0.001). Failure to reach significance in pair C/D is a 
consequence of the individual performance of Udo, which was again not significantly above 
chance (Binomial test: P = 0.185, all others: P ≤ 0.036). However, Bruce and Udo were still 
correct in more than 50% of the trials within each pair. Also, the mean performance of the 
birds did not increase or decrease over the course of testing (Pearson: N = 8, r = -0.338, P = 
0.413). Finally, we calculated the reward/non-reward ratio (Rx = Nr/Nn) for stimulus B and D. 
For all three birds, RB was larger than RD (RB:RD: Bruce: 3.24:0.54; Udo: 3.43:1.21; Pronto: 
5.00:0.45). 
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Figure 2: Choice accuracy of all three birds across the eight test blocks within the four familiar training pairs 
(left side of the dashed line) and the TI pair (right side of the dashed line). The horizontal line indicates chance 
level. Plots show mean ± SD.  
 
Discussion 
Our study shows that the three tested jackdaws were able to infer the relationship of two non- 
adjacent stimuli, which had never been presented together before. As other socially living 
animals, it seems that jackdaws possess the capability to transitively infer unknown 
relationships. The subjects of several other studies had been trained on the same five item 
series, but comparisons are difficult because of different training criteria and small differences 
in the daily training regime (Gillan 1981; Weiß, Kehmeier, and Schloegl 2010; Lazareva et al. 
2004; Lazareva and Wasserman 2006). In the most comparable study, rhesus monkeys 
(Treichler and van Tilburg 1996) learned the sequence only slightly faster than the jackdaws.  
Due to the non-reinforcement of the TI trials during the test, it is unlikely that the task 
was solved via a rapid learning mechanism. Additionally, Pronto was correct in 100% of the 
test trials and Udo was error-free until block seven, while Bruce made an error each in the 
first two blocks. Thus, the birds solved the task instantaneously. Generally, our data support 
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the assumption that TI is a ubiquitous ability in social animals and seems to be wide-spread in 
the animal kingdom. Furthermore, performance seems to be linked to the degree of social 
complexity, as the studies by Bond et al. (2003; 2010) and Maclean et al. (2008) found that 
the accuracy and robustness of TI correlated with the degree of sociality. Additionally, Weiß 
et al. (2010) found that the early social environment of goslings seemed to have influenced 
their performance in a TI task; in this study, goslings that grew up in smaller families required 
less training to learn the artificial hierarchy presented in the test than goslings in larger 
families. The authors argued that small families are more involved in interactions with flock 
members and therefore, goslings of smaller families may have more opportunities to learn 
about dyadic relationships than goslings with more siblings. Accordingly, it seems as if the 
link between social complexity and TI is existent but whether it is dependent on group size, 
structure or the number of interactions within a social system is still unclear. However, the 
claim that TI is linked to social complexity depends so far on correlative data only, as non-
social animals have not been tested. It is noteworthy that recent studies on a solitary living 
tortoise species indicate that despite their solitary lifestyle they possess socio-cognitive skills 
such as gaze following (Wilkinson, Mandl, et al. 2010) and social learning (Wilkinson, 
Kuenstner, et al. 2010) and an exploration of TI in these or other solitary living species seems 
worthwhile.  
In addition to the question of which animals are capable of TI, the underlying 
mechanisms are not yet fully understood. To answer this question longer hierarchical 
sequences which contain more than one TI pair are advantageous, because then pairs with 
different number of stimuli in between are available ("symbolic distance effect" Moyer and 
Bayer 1976) and more possibilities to clarify the underlying mechanisms of TI are given 
(Bond, Wei, and Kamil 2010). Unfortunately, we were only able to test a five item series due 
to logistical reasons and the already very long testing procedure of two years. In consequence, 
we are restricted in our possibilities to assess the cognitive mechanism the jackdaws relied on. 
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Nevertheless, we were able to calculate the reward/non-reward ratio Rx for the different 
stimuli of a TI pair. Similar to other studies (Lazareva et al. 2004; Lazareva and Wasserman 
2006; Zorina, Kalinina, and Markina 1996), for all three jackdaws was this ratio biased 
towards B, thus suggesting the possibility that the birds solved the task associatively. 
Lazareva and colleagues (2006)  tested pigeons and designed the experiment in the way that 
for some pigeons, RB > RD and in others it was vice versa with RB < RD. However, 
independent of the relative associative strength of B, all pigeons preferred B over D in the TI 
test. Thus, it is only suggestive and not conclusive that our jackdaws solved the TI test 
according to an associative model and not to a relational one. In conclusion our study shows 
that jackdaws are capable of TI, but the underlying mechanisms they used to solve the task 
are still unclear.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The present dissertation supports the notion that parrots are capable of reasoning. One African 
grey parrot Psittacus erithacus has demonstrated the ability of inference by exclusion, which 
has so far only been shown in Great apes (Call 2006). Therefore, the results support the 
convergent evolution hypothesis (Emery and Clayton 2004) which suggests that similar levels 
and expressions of intelligence have developed in parallel in birds and mammals. 
As shown in Chapter 4, one Grey parrot succeeded in an inference by exclusion task. 
The possibility that this success was based on associative learning mechanisms was controlled 
and tested for and was rejected as a valid explanation for the bird’s behaviour. It is, therefore, 
concluded that the bird had formed a mental representation of the contents of the cup. The 
result contradicts Penn and Povinelli’s (2007a, b) conclusion that insight and reasoning is not 
expressed in non-human animals and supports the notion that non-human animals are capable 
of this complex form of reasoning (Bird and Emery 2009; Call 2004, 2006; Emery and 
Clayton 2004; Pepperberg 1999; Taylor et al. 2009). The fact that only one animal succeeded 
in the inference by exclusion task might leave the data open to criticism. However, the 
successful performance of this one animal shows that the cognitive skill tested for lies within 
the general capabilities of the species. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that individual 
differences in performance levels, such as some animals succeeding while others do not, 
might give a deeper insight into the nature of the cognitive processes underlying a specific 
task (Plomin 2001). Such differences can, for example, be explained by differences in general 
intelligence, pre-experience, or personality. 
Species with high general intelligence are prone to large individual differences on 
complex tasks, while easy tasks produce relatively unanimous results (Plomin 2001). Thus, 
within a species some individuals can sport more strongly expressed cognitive abilities than 
others. Colloquially said, some individuals within a species might just be smarter or 
differently motivated than others. Intra-species variability within the more complex tasks as 
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compared to the simple tasks is exactly what has been shown in the present dissertation. No 
individual differences were found in a simple object manipulation task performed by carrion 
crows Corvus corone corone, jackdaws Corvus monedula, and African grey parrots in 
Chapter 2 and 3 where the birds were tested for the effects of a simple low-level mechanism, 
local enhancement. In contrast, large differences were found in the more difficult exclusion 
task in the crows in Chapter 2, where the birds were required to choose one target based on 
the knowledge about another target. Similarly, Grey parrots showed great intra-specific 
variability in a highly complex inference by exclusion task described in Chapter 4, in which 
the parrots were prevented from using any low-level mechanisms in their choice of the correct 
target. Interestingly, there also seem to be differences between individuals within the same 
species of how enhancement affects their ability to solve higher order problems. While some 
birds are unable to solve a problem due to overshadowing from low-level mechanisms, others 
appear unaffected. 
While the individual differences may be explained within the general intelligence 
framework, it is also possible that the birds’ previous experiences and histories, which are 
sometimes not fully known, are responsible for the differences in performance. Supporting 
this assumption a study by Pepperberg (2007) found that Grey parrots varied in the methods 
with which they tried to master a means-end understanding task. Even though her study 
offered the inequality of the language training the birds had received as a possible explanation 
for the individual differences, the author states that different personalities cannot be excluded 
as an explanation. 
The possibility that differences between individuals are biologically meaningful 
variations has in the past often been neglected (Wilson 1998), but now it is generally accepted 
that animals have different personality types which appear to be closely linked to those of 
humans (Carere and Eens 2005; Carere and Locurto 2011). The effects of personality on 
fitness (Dingemanse and Réale 2005), learning (Titulaer et al. 2012), and the ability to form 
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sets of routine (Groothuis and Carere 2005) have already been established, while there is little 
empirical evidence linking personality traits with other cognitive abilities. For a personality 
trait to be established as such, it is paramount to provide, besides trait linkage, evidence of 
behavioural consistency over time and across circumstances in a large number of animals. 
However, the present thesis was not designed to test for personality differences in birds. In 
reverse though, differences in personality could explain the large individual differences found 
in Chapter 2 and 4. Furthermore, it appears that similar to the notion of general intelligence, 
personality differences are only reflected in difficult tasks (Titulaer et al. 2012), again 
reflecting the data presented above. 
A promising avenue for future studies would be to test for personality differences in a 
large number of birds and to link these to a whole battery of cognitive tasks, including tests of 
various different cognitive domains. A comprehensive cognitive test battery has already been 
established for human children and Great apes by Herrmann (2007) and adapted by Schmitt 
and colleagues (2012) for the use with monkeys. It is now time for an equivalent test battery 
for the use with birds. Testing the effect of personality differences on cognitive performance 
would be particularly interesting in a long-term study providing a closely controlled 
environment for all subjects from fledgling on, thus avoiding any differences in prior 
experience. Additionally, it would be worthwhile to attend to differences in motivation and 
distractibility within and between species as those factors could also lead to individual 
differences in cognitive tasks.  
Besides the interesting intra-specific differences the present thesis has also revealed 
meaningful inter-specific differences. Various studies of the project ‘reasoning in birds’ of 
our study group have found that ravens Corvus corax (Schloegl et al. 2009), African grey 
parrots (Schmidt et al. unpubl.), and carrion crows (Chapter 2) were able to show successful 
exclusion performance in a cup-lifting experiment, while jackdaws (Schloegl 2011) and keas 
Nestor notabilis (Schloegl et al. 2009) were unsuccessfully in the same setup. It has been 
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suggested that, at least in corvids, caching abilities might be a key to solving this task 
(Schloegl et al. 2009; Schloegl 2011; Chapter 2), as both ravens and carrion crows are 
caching species and jackdaws are not. However, this does not explain the differential 
performance of the parrots. Although the keas failure might well be due to an overshadowing 
effect of their extreme neophilia (O'Hara et al. 2012), no obvious explanation appears to fit in 
the successful performance of the Grey parrots. 
However, it is possible that the dissimilarities can be explained with differences in 
general intelligence levels of the different species. Grey parrots, for example, might possess a 
high level of general intelligence and might, thus, be able to solve tasks which are not 
immediately ecologically relevant for them. Similarly, it is possible that the jackdaws have a 
lower level of general intelligence than the other corvid species that have been tested on the 
same task, thus, failing the exclusion task which appears to be of little ecological relevance 
for them. 
The adaptive specialization hypothesis (de Kort and Clayton 2006; Kamil 1987), 
however, would be in favour of the aforementioned adaptive qualities of the task. As 
jackdaws do not cache food they might have less strongly expressed physical cognition 
abilities. Nonetheless, jackdaws are very social birds that have been shown to be sensitive to 
social cues and social learning (Scheid et al. 2007; Schwab et al. 2008). Chapter 5 describes a 
task which is believed to experimentally reflect a social network – transitive inference. The 
results show that jackdaws were able to solve this task successfully. However, at present it is 
not possible to determine with reasonable certainty which mechanism the birds used to solve 
the task, mental representations or associative learning. To find out which of the two possible 
mechanisms was used, future studies should introduce dissociation between the two targets by 
artificially increasing the value of one stimulus against the direction expected by the mental 
representation of the target list, as was done by Lazareva (2006) with pigeons Columba livia. 
However, the results point to the notion that the jackdaws’ ecology might influence their 
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abilities and, thus, lend support to the adaptive specialization hypothesis. To further 
investigate this issue, future studies should test the performance of the only other non-caching 
corvid species, the white-throated magpie-jay Calositta formosa. 
In contrast to the adaptive specialization hypothesis, the general process view states 
that closely related species with different ecologies should not show large differences in their 
cognitive abilities (Bolhuis and Macphail 2001). As such high cognitive performances 
amongst birds would be expected in the parrot and corvid families. Overall, high cognitive 
performance has been found in all the tested species (Gould-Beierle 2000; Pepperberg 1999; 
Wascher et al. 2012; Chapter 2-5). However, significant differences within the families have 
also been noted (Schloegl et al. 2009; Schloegl 2011; Chapter 2-5). At present, it is 
impossible to know whether these differences are based on a true inability of some species to 
succeed in the given tasks or whether they are simply due to the experimental design and 
execution of the tasks. 
To date only little information is available on any possible interactions between the 
different models integrating, for example, general intelligence with the adaptive specialization 
hypothesis (Reader et al. 2011). Based on the results presented in the present thesis it appears 
possible that the importance of adaptive specialization is dependent on the level of general 
intelligence. Thus, for those animals that possess only comparatively low general intelligence 
areas of adaptive value might be of great importance. They might show outstanding 
performances in one particular area which is especially relevant to their ecological situation 
while not being very advanced in performing tasks outside their ecological niche. Those 
animals that sport high general intelligence, however, might be able to succeed in a whole 
range of complex tasks, independent of whether these are of immediate adaptive value to 
them. General intelligence might originally have been an adaptive trait because it increased 
flexibility, but through its development it might have freed the species possessing this trait 
from the immediate adaptive pressures of their particular niche. 
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Thus, assuming that African grey parrots have high general intelligence, this 
combined model would explain their impressive performance on the inference by exclusion 
task which might not be of great adaptive value to a non-caching species. Similarly, assuming 
comparatively low general intelligence in jackdaws, the model would explain their good 
performance in the transitive inference task while failing in tasks of a similar level of 
complexity in a different cognitive domain, which might be less adaptive to their social but 
non-caching nature. 
To clarify the respective importance of ecological relevance and general intelligence 
future studies should test ecologically irrelevant tasks as part of a large cognitive test battery 
which approaches each species’ general intelligence across domains. For example, tests on 
tool-use related abilities in non-tool-using species are likely to provide a clearer idea of a 
species’ general intelligence (Bird and Emery 2009; Tebbich et al. 2007), given that the 
species’ physical abilities are taken into account. Furthermore, additional investigations of 
transitive inference in non-social species are needed to determine whether this mechanism, 
which is generally accepted as social throughout the literature (Bond et al. 2003; Bond et al. 
2010; Maclean et al. 2008), is indeed only found in social animals. Here it would be 
particularly interesting to test species which are truly solitary from hatching onwards and 
have never received any parental care, such as red-footed tortoises Geochelone carbonaria or 
octopus Octopus vulgaris. Thus, a detailed comparison of the performance on ecologically 
relevant and irrelevant tasks in both closely related bird species and those of distantly related 
families is called for at this stage. 
In conclusion, the results of the present dissertation support convergent evolution, as 
different bird species have been proven proficient in complex cognitive tasks. In particular, 
inference by exclusion has been shown in an African grey parrot, which is the first 
demonstration of this ability outside of great apes and humans (Call 2006). Furthermore, the 
results suggest that the cognitive abilities of birds might be best explained by a model 
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combining the notion of general intelligence with the adaptive specialization hypothesis. As 
such, it is suggested that Grey parrots have a high general intelligence level allowing them to 
readily solve even adaptively irrelevant tasks. In contrast, jackdaws are suggested to possess 
low general intelligence in comparison with other corvids, therefore, excelling only in tasks 
that are ecologically relevant to them. Interestingly, low-level mechanisms such as local 
enhancement affected all tested species, suggesting that these are basic traits which are 
independent of the level of general intelligence and adaptive relevance. Finally, my present 
results show that reasoning does not only exist in humans, but also in non-human animals and 
might help bridge the gap between general intelligence and adaptive specialization. 
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